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April 8, 2014
To the
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pensylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-001
AskDOJ@usdoj.gov
Failing States And Theirs Dirty Criminal Affairs
- one after the other
CONTACT LOST
To the Boeing 777-200 and the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH 370
APPROVED AND PERMITTED BY THE FAA, the IATA, the ICAO and the others
THE STATE OF AFFAIRS
Any lessons learned?
Dear Madams and Sirs,
A Boeing 777-200 (Flight MH 370) disappeared March 8 this year on a routine night flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. Investigators assume the plane crashed in the southern Indian Ocean and all of the 239 passengers and crew on board (most of the people on board the flight were Chinese) are dead, among them 3 American citizens. Malaysia didn’t not only lose a plane; many people lost theirs lives – seems it was avoidable, as matters stand at the moment.
After the deadly 9/11 attacks and in view of what happened 9/11 when approaching airplanes could not be contacted, automatically tracked and identified because the hijackers had switched off the respective devices, and in view of what happened after the July 1, 2009 crash of an Air France Airbus A330-200 in the Atlantic Ocean carrying 228 people during its night flight AF 447 from Rio to Paris (it took two years to locate and to pick up the black box from the bottom), one would by now have expected the introduction of reviewed technical standards, safety requirements, regulations and practices.
Apparently lessons haven’t been learnt.
1. Intentional lost of contact: Three of the 9/11 hijacked aircraft had their transponders switched off because aircraft-transponders work not automated (like the Automatic Identification System [AIS] on the merchant ships) but can arbitrarily be controlled by humans. Not only transponders but also all other communication systems aboard the Boeing can be manually switched off. As whoever was in control of Flight MH 370 cruising over the Bay of Thailand and during the following seven more hours the missing airliner had continued flying on its unusual unplanned route far off course diverted from its original flight path, he could hide plane’s track, mask it’s altitude and camouflage it’s identification by switching off the transponder and all the other radio links including the (realize via SATCOM/INMARSAT) Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS), making so the plane out of reach, invisible for air-traffic controllers and potentially dangerous for public safety. Three separate communication systems have been disabled manually to mask plane’s location, to avoid detection and to hide it from radars and satellites. The backup transponder hasn’t been automatically activated, because nobody at Boeing was worry about it. All equipment enabling the plane to be tracked was wilful disabled. The radio communication between the cockpit of MH 370 and air traffic controllers was broken: Both, air-traffic personnel and pilots of other aircraft, were trying to contact Malaysian 370 by radio but failing to reach the plane. Apparently it is nowadays dead easy for everyone to convert an airliner into a civilian stealth bomber.
2. Danger of shooting down: These circumstances led to the danger for this now unidentified flying aircraft with 239 people on board crossing eventually the airspace of such countries like Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia in the opposite direction to MH 370 scheduled route and breaching theirs air defence, because it could have been shoot down by the military – especially (if the plane would have flown at a low altitude) by the U.S. Navy Drunken Seventh Fleet operating in the eastern Indian Ocean according to its area of responsibility – as already happened over the Persian Gulf with the Iran Air Flight IR 655 (an Airbus 330B2-203 carrying 290 people), mistaken shot down on July 3, 1988 by the drunken crew of USS Vincennes; as already happened in other cases: e.g. Libyan Airlines Flight 114 on Feb. 21, 1973 over Sinai (a Boeing 727 shot down by Israelis, 118 people aboard died); Korean Air Flight 007 (a Boeing 747 with 269 people on board) shot down on September 1, 1983 by Soviets near Sakhalin, all died. Some countries overreact to a violation of theirs airspace. So this story could happen again during the flight MH 370.
3. Danger of hijacking-crash-attack: Although an unidentified flying object has been seen by military-radars of the Malaysian, Thai and other Air Forces, no reaction by them to intercept this fly or even to communicate this incident between the countries in this region took place. The aircraft would easily have fly in the event of a hijacking terrorist background into the Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur or anywhere else, as we have seen on 9/11. A new terrorist attack with the help of the hijacked Boeing was at any time possible. But who cared?
4. Danger of crash with other plane: Because transponders broadcast aircraft’s heading, altitude, speed and identification code to the ground assistance and beyond it they warn other nearby planes of theirs course and altitude, the lack of reporting such basic anti-collision data could have lead to the crash with an other plane. Who was in the duty to take action? Malaysia, Thailand, India and Indonesia – but all the Asian Paper Tiger failed.
5. Danger of crash with a ship: MH 370 flown first over the Bay of Thailand, than it crossed the Malaysian Peninsula, flown after that across the Strait of Malacca (one of the busiest shipping route of the world) than at the north-western coast of Sumatra and finally south across the Indian Ocean towards Australia. With its cruising speed of 990 kph and its mass of 300-ton was the unidentified plane out of control a potential danger for the shipping. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) was responsible for maritime SECURITÉ warnings to ALL SHIPS over NAVTEX and INMARSAT concerning the NAVAREA X according to the GMDSS-Regulations and the international maritime law. The same regulations obligated to the same kind of warnings for the NAVAREA XI (Japan) and the NAVAREA VIII (India). India, Japan and Australia failed miserably at Dec. 26, 2004 because of gross negligent omission the SECURITÉ warnings of the impending tsunami. Their common mess lead to the same failure on March 8, 2014. Failing states!
6. Shoddy control practice and security precautions at the airport: Two passengers boarded illegal Flight 370 with fake travel documents using stolen passports despite the data have been storage in the Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database – a typical bureaucratic mess and careless work at the Kuala Lumpur airport and the same as 10 years ago on 9/11 2001 in America.
7. Lack of video-footage: Looking back at other disasters:
1) On July 25, 2000 the Flight 4590 (a Concorde flight operated by the poubelle aérienne named Air France) ended only minutes after the take-off crashing into a Hotel near the airport in Gonesse (113 people died). During the takeoff the aircraft was already on fire and the rolling plane spewed on the runway a large plume of flame. The Concorde, a highly dangerous not safe operated plane, had more than 70 incidents involving tyres between 1979 and 2000, but the producer, the Air France and the airport operating authority have failed to take appropriate steps to avoid the coming disaster. Bursting tyres lead as a rule to a serious incident or to a crash. The most important questions during the investigation were: When and where exactly caught the plane fire? Did the pilot immediately know about it and could he directly stop the plane? If not: Why the start on the runway in this case of fire hasn’t been broken off automatically? And: Has the airport operator made his duty and checked the runway for lying dangerous trash and scrap before giving clear ready for takeoff? Nobody could answer these most important questions because there were no video surveillance cameras along the runway. Everything what the investigators had to theirs disposal were two private photos (accidental making by two tourists) of the burning plane. Everybody knows that the most likely time of a crash is the phase of starting and landing on or near the runway. But no one surveillance video of Flight 4590 at the airport in Paris exists.
Risks of terror lead the most developed countries to install video cameras in almost each toilet room. Our ministers of interior run amok when it comes to installing of millions of video-cameras everywhere in the public urban areas. So it is for example not possible in London to go for a piss under a tree without having seen by all the cameras at each corner. But no one camera was in place on July 2000 in Paris in a such security sensitive area like the Charles de Gaulle Airport. Almost each fast food stand in the U.S. is monitored by video-cameras. But obviously no one was installed for the purpose of monitoring the most important building in Washington for the U.S. defence capability: the Pentagon. The Pentagon monitors the globe and each bit of men’s trace in internet but obviously not the Pentagon itself (!). Therefore, after the Fly AA 77 crashed into Pentagon, no one surveillance video of the crash was available and published, till now. Nothing surprises me anymore, to be exact neither in Europe nor in America. Everywhere we will find the same pigsty or even much worst. So it would not surprise if there is no one video camera in the cockpit of the Boeing or the Airbus.
2) An Airbus A320-233 of the TAM Airlines (Flight 3054) from Porto Alegre to São Paulo, Brazil on July 17, 2007 overran the runway at São Paulo and crashed into a nearby warehouse adjacent to a Shell gas filling station. All 181 people on board were killed, along with 12 people on the ground - the deadliest air disaster in Brazilian territory, and the deadliest aviation accident involving an Airbus A320 anywhere in the world. The aircraft was equipped with thrust reversers to help slow the airplane down on landing and break on the runway. Surveillance videos showed that the aircraft was touching down at the normal touch-down point on the runway, but it did not slow down normally, crossing the far end of the runway at a high speed, then bearing to the left, continued off the runway and exploded on impact with a facility. More than two years after the accident, the Brazilian investigation authority announced the results of official investigations. The report shows that one of the thrust levers, which control engines, the right one, was in position to accelerate when it should be in the idle-position. The pilots mistakenly retarded only the left engine to idle. The resulting asymmetric thrust condition resulted in a loss of control and a crash. Two experienced pilots (sitting both in cockpit) having each one over 14 000 hours flying praxis could not keep under control the aircraft because no clear and understandable warnings - which had to be given by the fly control system - for this elementary and security relevant situation have been provided and to heard. The question about which factors – flight control logic system failure, or pilots failure, or both – played the main role and caused the accident could not be answered definitely because of lack the video surveillance in cockpit. This kind of data could reliable answer which configuration of error and failure has been taken place and lead quickly to the right conclusions. In fact it was an evident primary failure of the aircraft manufacturer that led subsequently to the secondary pilot error.
3) An Air France Flight 447 (Airbus A330-203), from Rio de Janeiro to Paris on June 1, 2009 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. The aircraft broke up on impact; everyone on board died (228 passengers, aircrew and cabin crew from 32 countries aboard the Airbus). The accident was the deadliest in the history of Air France and also the Airbus A330's deadliest fatal accident. The investigation was hampered because the aircraft's black boxes, the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) were not recovered from the ocean floor until May 2011, nearly two years later, although the transmission by ACARS, 4 minutes before the crash, contained a set of last coordinates. The final investigation report, released on 5th July 2012 concluded that the aircraft crashed after inconsistencies between the airspeed measurements caused the autopilot to disconnect, after which the crew reacted incorrectly and ultimately led the aircraft to a crash. Correct? Certainly not in the required clearness!
Out of control: Flight 447 was crewed by three pilots: a captain and two first officers. Two co-pilots was sitting in the cockpit during the plain was coming in a bad weather front. The first one, a pilot not flying (PNF), sitting on the left side (6540 flying hours, 4500 at Airbus) and the second one, the pilot flying (PF) on the right side (3000 flying hours, 800 at Airbus). The captain left the cockpit to rest at 02:01. About ten minutes later (1.5 minutes after the autopilot was deactivated) he re-entered the cockpit and stayed there mentally disorientated until the crash. Why could it be possible? After breaking down a one (or more) speed-measure instrument(s) it was coming to a different and conflicting airspeed measurements. This inconsistency caused the automatically switching off the autopilot: the beginning of the end. Within 4 minutes the wings lost lift because pilots continued making nose-up inputs and the angle of attack rapidly increased – the aircraft was oriented nose-up but descending steeply. The aircraft (without any structural damage and with normal functioning engines) was in free fall like a stone dropping from 11.600 m at a vertical speed of 200 km/h and after only 3.5 minutes at a speed over ground of 200 km/h struck at a speed of 280 km/h in a normal flight attitude the ocean. No measures for a sea landing have been taken. The aircraft sent before the crash (between 02:10 UTC and 02:14 UTC) a series of electronic messages: 6 failure reports (FLR) and 19 warnings (WRN) were transmitted. These messages, posted to cockpit and sent from an onboard monitoring, testing and reporting system via the ACARS and the INMARSAT-AOR satellite to the Air France, indicate a fault in the speed data system. Experts said that "Piloting becomes very difficult, near impossible, without reliable speed data." The following 24 failure messages and warnings resulted from equipment failure concerned navigation, auto-flight and flight control and the reaction of crew immediately afterwards present the impressive, in fact shocking and dreadful, reconstruction of this fatal accident.
Chaos in the cockpit (A combination of more factors is the explanation why a modern airliner piloting by a crew of three pilots could turn within 4 minutes in a peace of lead and had fallen into the ocean fully intact neither due to mechanical failure nor the aircraft has being overwhelmed by the weather, but because the flight crew had raised the aircraft's nose, reducing its speed until it entered an aerodynamic stall):
24 OPTICAL WARNINS:
02:10 WARNING AUTO FLT AP OFF | WARNING AUTO FLT | WARNING F/CTL ALTN LAW | WARNING FLAG ON CAPT PFD (PFD = Primary flight display) |WARNING FLAG ON F/O PFD | WARNING AUTO FLT A/THR OFF | WARNING NAV TCAS FAULT | WARNING FLAG ON CAPT PFD/WARNING FLAG ON F/O PFD | WARNING F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT (rudder travel limiter fault) | WARNING MAINTENANCE STATUS | WARNING MAINTENANCE STATUS FAILURE EFCS2 1 (Electronic Flight Control System 2) | FAILURE EFCS1 X2 | WARNING FLAG ON CAPT PFD | WARNING FLAG ON F/O PFD | WARNING NAV ADR DISAGREE (Discrepancy in Navigation ADR: Air-Data-Reference-Systems) | FAILURE ISIS 1 (Integrated Standby Instrument) | FAILURE IR2 1, EFCS1X, IR1, IR3 | WARNING F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT | WARNING F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT | 02:14 WARNING MAINTENANCE STATUS | FAILURE AFS (Automatic Flight System) | WARNING ADVISORY … CRASH! All were immediately killed.
75 AUDIBLE “STALL WARNINGS” have been heard in cockpit at this time without the pilots became aware of that fact of immediately vital emergency and without any adequate reaction by them to counteract.
PILOT’S REACTIONS (Translation into German):
02:08 Sind wir uns einig, dass wir manuell fliegen?
02:10 Ich habe die Steuerung. - Okay. - Was ist das denn? - Wir haben keine korrekte… Wir haben keine korrekte Geschwindigkeitsanzeige. - Nun haben wir sie also verloren, die, die, die Geschwindigkeiten? - Achte auf deine Geschwindigkeit. Achte auf deine Geschwindigkeit. - OK, OK, ich gehe wieder in den Sinkflug. - Stabilisiere…- Ja. - Sink wieder… Wir sind dabei weiter zu steigen, ihm zufolge… ihm zufolge steigst du, also sink wieder. - Okay. - Sink wieder! - Und los geht's, wir sinken wieder. - Vorsichtig! - Wir sind im… ja, wir sind im "climb" (Steigflug). - Verdammt, wo ist er… ähm? Verdammt! - Ich bin in volle Kraft voraus, ja? - Verdammt, kommt er oder kommt er nicht? Wir haben immer noch die Motoren! Was zum Teufel ist da los? Ich verstehe nicht, was da geschieht. - Verdammt, ich habe keine Kontrolle mehr über das Flugzeug, ich habe keine Kontrolle mehr über das Flugzeug! - Die Steuerung nach links! - Capt.: Eh… Was macht ihr da? - Wir verlieren die Kontrolle über das Flugzeug! - Wir haben komplett die Kontrolle über das Flugzeug verloren. Das ist vollkommen unverständlich… Wir haben alles versucht… - Was glaubst du? Was glaubst du? Was müssen wir tun? - Capt.: Nun, ich weiß es nicht! - Zieh hoch… zieh hoch… zieh hoch… zieh hoch… - Aber ich ziehe doch die ganze Zeit über voll hoch! - Capt.: Nein, nein, nein… zieh nicht hoch… nein, nein. - Dann geh in den Sinkflug… Also, gib mir die Steuerung… Die Steuerung an mich! - Verdammt, wir werden aufschlagen… Scheiße, das ist nicht wahr!
02:14 - Aber was geschieht hier? - Capt.: Neigung 10 Grad... AUFPRALL!
Für den Unfall waren folgende Ereignisse ursächlich:
· Die Geschwindigkeitssensoren vereisten.
· Die von den Rechnern identifizierte Unstimmigkeit der Geschwindigkeitssensoren (sprich unterschiedliche also unzuverlässige Geschwindigkeitsmesswerte) führte zur automatischen Abschaltung/Deaktivierung des Autopilots durch den Bordcomputer.
· Die Piloten nahmen den Verlust der Geschwindigkeitsanzeigen, die Abschaltung des Autopilots und seinen Übergang in den Modus „Alternate Law“ zur Kenntnis, wussten aber nicht, was in dieser Situation richtigerweise zu tun gewesen wäre. Alarmsignale wurden von Anfang an als irrelevant betrachtet und nicht beachtet. Allein diese Situation überforderte also die Piloten hoffnungslos. Die gravierenden Folgen des Wechsels der Steuerelektronik in den Modus „Alternate Law“ ohne jedes Anstellwinkel-Schutzsystem wurden von den Piloten nicht erkannt und verstanden (In diesem Modus verhindert die Flugsteuerungssoftware offenbar nicht, dass der Pilot das Flugzeug gegebenenfalls außerhalb der Grenze der Flugfähigkeit bringt).
· Obwohl die Piloten die Steuerung nicht betätigten, rollte das Flugzeug innerhalb von zwei Sekunden um 8,4 Grad nach rechts (vermutlich wegen Turbulenzen).
· Nun haben die Piloten versucht, das Flugzeug wieder per Hand unter Kontrolle zu bekommen und zu halten. Die Steuermanöver des Piloten waren jedoch unangemessen, überzogen, kontraproduktiv und falsch und bestanden aus einem Hochziehen des Flugzeugs und aus Aktionen am Steuerknüppel, die sich gegenseitig konterkarierten. Dies war darauf zurückzuführen, dass eine technisch hochgefährliche Absurdität bei der Steuerung von Airbus eingebaut ist nämlich, wenn von der Airline den Piloten nicht einmal eine klare Rollenverteilung bei der manuellen Flugzeugsteuerung beigebracht wird (wie im vorliegendem Fall) und beide gleichzeitig an eigenem Steuerknüppel fummeln (wie im vorligendem Fall), kann es durchaus passieren, dass der eine versucht die Maschine hochzuziehen und der andere dabei genau das Gegenteil tut (wie im vorliegendem Fall), was dazu führt, dass sich beide Aktionen gegenseitig aufheben: Wie es scheint also, grob fahrlässig konstruierte Steuerungstechnik!
· Es fehlten visuelle Informationen, die eine Bestätigung des Strömungsabrisses ermöglicht hätten. Die ausgegebene Überziehwarnung („stall warning“) wurde von der Besatzung ignoriert. Der Anstellwinkel des Flugzeugs wurde den Piloten nicht direkt angezeigt, weshalb keiner der Piloten die Überziehsituation und somit die Gefahr des Absturzes erkannt hat.
· Die vom System ausgegebenen massiven Warnungen, deren Sinn und Ernsthaftigkeit von den Piloten nicht verstanden wurde (weshalb sie von der Besatzung ignoriert wurden), führten zu einer hohen emotionalen Belastung der beiden Piloten und stifteten Verwirrung statt Hilfe zu leisten und adäquate Lösungen anzubieten.
· Infolge des überzogenen Hochziehens des Flugzeugs, kam es zu einem Strömungsabriss, das Flugzeug sackte ab und fiel innerhalb kurzer Zeit wie ein Stein vom Himmel.
Ungeachtet der
· evidenten technische Unzulänglichkeiten des Flugzeugs
· der eklatanten Versäumnissen der Airline, die Piloten entsprechend zu trainieren (Ausbildung für manuelle Steuerung in großer Höhe und wie auf Geschwindigkeitsanomalien zu reagieren ist)
· unterlassener Berücksichtigung des Risikos, das aus einer Vereisung der Pitot-Sonden erwächst, seitens der für die Sicherheit zuständigen Stellen und der damit verbundenen Konsequenzen, die auch von den Piloten weder erkannt noch verstanden wurden
· fehlerhaften Anzeigen der Steuerelektronik die dazu führten, dass die Piloten Angaben der Flugkommandoanzeigen befolgten, die die Besatzung in ihren Aktionen bestätigten, obwohl sie falsch waren, sah der Saftladen namens BEA in sträflicher Art und Weise einen Pilotenfehler als primäre Ursache für den Absturz.
Schon bei der Untersuchung des Concorde-Absturzes versagte dieser staatsgelenkte Augiasstall jämmerlich. Zur Erinnerung: Wenige Minuten nach dem Start des bereits brennenden Flugzeugs, das in Frankreich hergestellt und von der Air France betrieben wurde und in Paris gestartet war, zerschellte es wenige Minuten nach dem Start in einem Feuerball mit über 100 Insassen an Bord. Es bedarf einer beispielslosen Wahrheitsverdrehung seitens der BEA sowie Rabulistik und Rechtsbeugung des anschließend involvierten französischen Gerichts, um die Verantwortung und Schuld für die Katastrophe (so absurd und unverfroren es auch klingen mag) nicht bei den Franzosen selbst zu suchen sondern den Amerikanern (!) in die Schuhe zu schieben.
In dem Air-France-Flight-447-Untersuchungsbericht hat die BEA auch fälschlich keine andere Ursache als das Überziehen des Flugzeugs während der manuellen Steuerung und der daraus folgende Strömungsabriss genannt, obgleich gerade die mittelbaren Ursachen für den Absturz von entscheidender Bedeutung waren und zu dieser vermeidbaren Katastrophe führten. Chesley B. Sullenberger, Sachverständiger für Flugunfälle, ist der Ansicht, dass der Unfall in einer Boeing mit geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit geschehen wäre. Während Airbus seine Cockpits mit Sidesticks ausstattet, verwendet Boeing im Gegensatz dazu klassische Steuerhörner. Diese sind mechanisch gekoppelt, die Sidesticks bei Airbus jedoch nicht. In einem Cockpit mit Steuerhörnern ist jede Steuereingabe des einen Piloten somit für den anderen Piloten klar sichtbar, überdies wird das Steuerhorn bei jeder Eingabe auch vergleichsweise stark bewegt. Bei Airbus reicht jedoch schon eine vergleichsweise geringe Positionsänderung des Sidesticks aus, um die Ruder von einer neutralen Position zum Vollausschlag zu bringen.
Videoaufnahmen vom Geschehen im Cockpit, die bekanntlich fehlten, hätten bei der Erforschung des Unfallhergangs gleich für Klarheit gesorgt und die lange andauernde Zusammensetzung aller Puzzlesteine überflüssig gemacht.
But the airline pilots and the pilots unions mean, a 300-ton-plane carrying hundreds of people is theirs private sweet home and not a workplace. The airline pilots mean flight deck must be seen like a restroom and not a workroom and further safety measures are not necessary. *) see a WSJ-article below.
8. Risk of fire: Potentially flammable batteries, identified as lithium-ion, were on board. There was a risk of fire or a danger of explosion. This danger has been cast to the winds. A similar case: In May 11, 1996 a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 (a ValuJet Flight 592), crashes in the Everglades near Miami, Florida, because oxygen generators in its cargo hold caught fire. All 110 people on board were killed. Someone neglected one’s duty and offended against safety regulations.
9. No action for lack of co-operation: Lack of co-operation in sharing intelligence caused the tsunami massacre 2004 in Thailand and in other Indian Ocean Rim countries. Ten years later there was a similar picture of criminal failure. But who speaks about this failure, the second one after the tsunami disaster 2004. U.S. Air Force and Australian Air Force, their intelligence agencies and military facilities, wasted billions of fiscal money a year, haven’t done their job. They have a big trap, boast of theirs capabilities and claimed, they would control the airspace over the Indian Ocean and keep there all under control. Among them: the National Security Agency (NSA), the Diego Garcia Command, the National Geospatial Agency (NGO), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) – the Australian are especially busy with the surveillance the Asians south-east side and look after to remain in control of the situation. Otherwise we could see how in the region the involved Royal Asian Paper Tiger Air Forces work: they completely failed the one more than the other. They were unable to detect the plane and eventually to prevent its strike in the ocean. India, an other basket case, was not able to communicate the flight through near the Car Nicobar Island, where is an Indian air force base situated. The USA, Russia, China, India, Japan, France, the UK, Thailand and others should already have had all data on the true track the missing aircraft during its fly using theirs high-resolution satellite imagery. But they were reluctant to share any disaster relevant information that could potentially reveal or shied light on their defence capabilities. Submarines patrolling the Indian Ocean or SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) with its hydroacustic facilities should have information in the event of a water impact. After the tsunami disaster 2004 it was claimed that the Pentagon knows about all what in the Indian Ocean happen: "If somewhere in the ocean a herring coughs," said 2005 a Pentagon official proudly, "we we’ll hear it." Nothing but hot air?
10. Looking for a needle in a bottle hay: Lack of urgent action by authorities, international regulators, manufacturer, airlines and insurers
· to change safety and security procedures regarding global tracking of flight information via satellite uplink;
· to enhance the ability to locate a missing aircraft;
· to avoid the inability to locate quick and reliable a plane in a case of an emergency;
· to avoid the inability to focused search and rescue missions;
· lack of urgent action by the airline industry to ensure a reliable global tracking of SAR-relevant aircraft-operations and communication data that can’t be deliberately disabled or deactivated
and in the particular MH 370 case of emergency
lack of reliable information, lack of essential track data that could help to determine the flight path the plane have travelled and the inability to locate the plane after flying thousands of kilometres off course
· created a basic uncertainty whether the plane reached an alternative destination or it ultimately crashed;
· created a basic uncertainty whether the aircraft crashed over land or at sea;
· widened in the beginning a target zone up to two dozen countries and the potential search area by thousands on square kilometres;
· hindered to narrow the search (searching path from the border of Kazakhstan to the southern Indian Ocean) and to estimate where Flight 370 might crashed: on shallow seas or maybe on land or have struck in a deep and remote area of the Indian Ocean: 26 nations were involving in searching an area covering some million square nautical miles of ocean and land;
· made a multinational search effort focused on a specific search area impossible: searchers were still looking in the wrong places; hundreds of pieces that was first identified as aircraft debris was identified later as a drifted junk in the ocean;
· failed efficient SAR operations involving navy and merchant ships, patrol aircraft, expert teams and investigators from more then two dozen countries searching for survivors, wreckage and answers;
· wasted weeks of the time and made the following search actions total ineffective at last.
Imprecise, incomplete, muddled or inaccurate information, intransparency, release of contradictory information and conflicting explanations about
· weather the plane flown over the countries coming into question or travelled near the border of those countries,
· response to questions about radar and satellite data concerning the flight,
· when exactly the plane eventually could went down and where exactly it might have struck the ocean,
and beyond that multiple false leads, lack of information from authorities, information delay, contrary misleading information (civilian officials sometimes contradicting military leaders), contradicting statements of authorities and even their lies delayed the search efforts, have made multi-national search operation chaotically and the hunt for any sign of Flight 370 extremely difficult. Even weeks after Flight 370 vanished, too many questions couldn’t be answered, which worsened the emotional condition of the passengers’ relatives. It was for search teams impossible to locate precise the impact site and the wreck of the missing plane, till now. And they have no credible leads helping the search for Flight 370. Over time all important questions couldn’t be answered in the appropriate time and manner. The governmental information policy of all involved parties was a disaster after disaster – the same pattern of failure like after the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004.
11. Being short of time: Under all these conditions it was still impossible to speed up the search looking precisely directed on the ocean floor for the plane’s black boxes (flight-recorder and voice recorder) before they stop emitting signals. They recorded crucial data about aircraft operations during the flight, which should explain what happened on the plane. The chances of finding the black boxes diminish with each day because its batteries will stop working in several days. After elapse this time could be however hard or impossible to find the flight recorders and find out what happened. Lack of crucial early multinational detective work and co-operation could than come to a bad end in records lost – the end of the story.
12. Hampered investigations and cover-up: Every piece of information on the Flight and Voice Data Recorders that should be recovering after a crash is important to analyse the accident and to avoid similar accidents in the future. Unfortunately the most involved parties did their utmost to obstruct and to stop these efforts and do it on and on so far. The same pattern of failure we observed after the tsunami 2004.
How could this still be possible?
If there is a reasonable explanation we would be grateful to hear it.
Apparently have Boeing, as the aircraft builder, the FAA,
as the supervising American authority for aircraft and the air security,
and all the others in responsibility, failed.
The lessons from past disasters haven’t been learnt at home and abroad.
We, the victims and survivors of the man-made tsunami massacre in Thailand Dec. 26, 2004, remember the lacking safety and risk management at this time. We claim the total U.S. lack of response (early urgent warnings and alerts) to the impending deadly and devastating tsunami 2004 that smashed the coasts of the Indian Ocean and killed thousands of tourists. We claim the lack of any response to the impending disaster by all high-developed countries as well. They have had all the technology and personnel to respond quickly and efficient. But nothing has been done to avoid the coming tsunami massacre. We urge the lack of effective reaction and consequences, till now. The following tsunami disasters: three in Indonesia, three in the west Pacific (Solomon Is., Samoa) two in Chile and one in Japan 2011 (a tsunami and nuclear disaster, as a result of that 20 000 people had to die) could only happen because no lessons have been learned from the big tsunami disaster 2004. At that time some of tsunami survivors hat to die because of lack of timely and proper medical assistance. Ten years on even someone has survived the crash no one survivor of the disaster had the chance to be still alive. In the case of Tsunami-Massacre 2004 all was going wrong in handling and response the crisis. Thailand’s authorities in Bangkok detected the correct quake data and they knew about the danger of tsunami but they warned nobody, wasted the time and waited until the tsunami hit the coasts. Thailand waited 10 days now to tell Malaysia: We have some relevant radar information concerning the Flight MH 370. In fact, nobody has played worst-case scenarios now and ten years ago and was asking if it happens: What is our response? How is to manage communication between our authorities and to other governments and organisations? Do we have the proper organisation to respond effectively to the crisis? Advanced technology was in place ten years ago and it is in place now. But we have now to do with the same kind of SNAFU. After the mega quake on Dec. 26, 2004 satellite imagery have could helped to establish the whole picture. But the information resulting from high-resolution satellite imagery of spy satellites the NSA which detected the triggered tsunami waves and theirs horrific impact on the coasts of Sumatra hasn’t been shared. The same denial to share disaster-relevant information could be identified as the NSA rejected to share this kind of information now. Everybody knows: The surveillance of the Indian Ocean obliges the U.S. Navy. But the U.S. Navy with its strategic marine base on Diego Garcia remained silent and invisible as the devastating and deadly tsunami 2004 was rolling across the Indian Ocean and its beaches.
So we identify in this case a similar range of inability to act, of bureaucratic incompetence to timely and proper reaction, of inefficiency by governmental authorities and theirs gross negligence to prevent man-made disasters. Victims of the MH 370 tragedy and we too don’t know by now what exactly happened because the published information remains unclear, inconsistent or fragmentary. But we all know already just enough to say:
That what has happened is a criminal scandal.
Both, the man-made tsunami massacre 2004
and the aftermath of the Flight MH 379 disaster
are a shame for the mankind.
These circumstances should worry everyone. Since America claimed to be in the driving seat and to control the moral high ground, since America is already de facto the world government it should fully assume their role, not hide itself and openly take over. Otherwise we’ll continue to see this picture of incompetence where clowns are running the show. What is now to be done? I suggest the first what would be necessary to do is brain work to seek the right solution. So put all your highly competent brain worker together: all the deadbeats, pinheads, baskets, lame and dead ducks, piss artists, highly honoured good-for-nothing wastrel, do-nothing manager, academically educated experts in thinking about nothing, Pentagons mentally retarded pen pushers, lobotomized brain damaged scientists, probability mentalists, and eventually other not burnout-syndrom-affected mental gambler. Don’t forget to involve in your brainstorming-process the jerks and sheepheads from the think mixed-tank named PTWC/NOAA and ask Andrew Hirshorn in Honolulu and your admiral Conrad Lautenbacher in Washington for help. As the Earth shook on Boxing Day by the mega-quake of an extraordinary magnitude, the first one said: As far as I am concerned the quake seemed for me to be so far away, it could just have taken place on the moon. Concerning the lack of tsunami warnings by the NOAA he said: We hadn’t got the appropriate telephone numbers in our books, none of them, sorry. And after the deadly failure of the NOAA, the second one, the boss of the NOAA exculpated himself and his piggery named the NOAA and laid like mad about the NOAA’s capability telling the public in a chat ‘Ask White House’ a pack of lies.
As you see in a case of an emergency one can relay on the American e x p e r t s; and in the follow up on theirs moral i n t e g r i t y, of course.
Because of lack the necessary changes and consequences in the commercial aviation so far, because of the huge death toll and the permanent risks for the public, because of the irresponsible bureaucratic and moral laxity the following accused handling parties according the motto ‘it’s business as usual’, it seems us necessary the US Department of Justice should take into account the mentioned basics in its investigations, hold an inquiry into the cause of the accident and take immediately judicial steps against
Boeing Co. – Airbus Group – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Luftfahrt- Bundesamt (LBA), BEA and other governmental air-safety supervisors – National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) – International Air Transport Association (IATA) – European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) – International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) – International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Association (IFALPA) – Airlines for America – Malaysia Airline/Government of Malaysia – Government of Thailand – Government of India – Government of Indonesia – Association of Asia-Pacific Airlines (AAPA) – Allianz AG (and eventually other insurers) – Munich Re AG (and eventually other re-insurers) – National Security Agency (NSA) – U.S. Navy Drunken Seventh Fleet – Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) – Diego Garcia Command – National Geospatial Agency (NGO) – Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) – Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) – Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) – Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) – Australian Royal Air Force – Australian Royal Navy
Who was criminally responsible for the disaster? In our opinion they are above the major links in the chain of failure. They haven’t understand the need to learn its own lessons, they have failed at their jobs and are to blame for the accident and for
We believe these are facts and indications enough to charge the accused.
Everyone should pay for irresponsible negligence!
Sincerely,
Jerzy Chojnowski
(Chairman-GTVRG e.V.)
www.gtvrg.de
PS. By the way: Both, Boeing Co. and Airbus Group, as aircraft manufacturer didn’t respond to our requests for comment on the matter.
*************************************************************
German Tsunami Victims Response Group e.V.
was established as a non-profit tsunami victims organisation
acting worldwide to prevent man-made disasters
Account for Donations:
www.gtvrg.de
*************************************************************
Flugnummer MH370 der Malaysia Airlines steht für eine der rätselhaftesten Katastrophen der Luftfahrt. 2014 verschwand die Maschine. Doch das Wrack wurde trotz aller Bemühungen bis heute nicht entdeckt.
© picture-alliance/AP Photo/J. Paul Graffito zum Gedenken an die Opfer im malaysischen Shah Alam nahe der Hauptstadt Kuala Lumpur (Archivbild) 17. Jan. 2017 Fast drei Jahre nach dem ungeklärten Ende von Flug MH370 ist die Unterwasser-Suche nach der Maschine eingestellt worden. Das teilte die Koordinierungsstelle im australischen Sydney mit. Die Entscheidung sei "nicht leichtfertig getroffen worden und auch nicht ohne Trauer". Die Behörden Malaysias, Australiens und Chinas, die an der Koordinierungsstelle beteiligt sind, hätten den Entschluss gemeinsam gefasst.
Bereits vor zwei Wochen hatte der malaysische Verkehrsminister Liow Tiong Lai angekündigt, die Maßnahmen bald zu beenden. Die Hoffnung, bis dahin das Flugzeugwrack noch zu finden, erfüllte sich nicht.
Stundenlang gen Süden
Flug MH370 war am 8. März 2014 aus bislang ungeklärter Ursache auf der Strecke von Kuala Lumpur nach Peking vom Kurs abgewichen. Dann verloren die Bodenstationen jeglichen Kontakt zu dem Jumbo. Nach Satellitenauswertungen nehmen Experten an, dass die Maschine mit 239 Insassen stundenlang Richtung Süden flog. Die Boeing 777 dürfte abgestürzt sein, als der Treibstoff ausging.
Unter Leitung der australischen Verkehrssicherheitsbehörde ATSB konzentrierte sich die Suche auf ein etwa 120.000 Quadratkilometer großes Meeresgebiet im Indischen Ozean. Laut einem im Dezember veröffentlichten ATSB-Bericht könnte das Flugzeug allerdings weiter nördlich abgestürzt sein. Die internationale Opfervereinigung Voice370 vermutet schon seit längerem, dass in einem falschen Gebiet nach der Maschine gesucht wurde. Sie hatte die Regierungen Malaysias, Australiens und Chinas nach Veröffentlichung der ATSB-Analyse aufgefordert, die Suche auszuweiten.
jj/stu (dpa, afp, ap)
To the
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pensylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-001
AskDOJ@usdoj.gov
Failing States And Theirs Dirty Criminal Affairs
- one after the other
CONTACT LOST
To the Boeing 777-200 and the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH 370
APPROVED AND PERMITTED BY THE FAA, the IATA, the ICAO and the others
THE STATE OF AFFAIRS
Any lessons learned?
Dear Madams and Sirs,
A Boeing 777-200 (Flight MH 370) disappeared March 8 this year on a routine night flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. Investigators assume the plane crashed in the southern Indian Ocean and all of the 239 passengers and crew on board (most of the people on board the flight were Chinese) are dead, among them 3 American citizens. Malaysia didn’t not only lose a plane; many people lost theirs lives – seems it was avoidable, as matters stand at the moment.
After the deadly 9/11 attacks and in view of what happened 9/11 when approaching airplanes could not be contacted, automatically tracked and identified because the hijackers had switched off the respective devices, and in view of what happened after the July 1, 2009 crash of an Air France Airbus A330-200 in the Atlantic Ocean carrying 228 people during its night flight AF 447 from Rio to Paris (it took two years to locate and to pick up the black box from the bottom), one would by now have expected the introduction of reviewed technical standards, safety requirements, regulations and practices.
Apparently lessons haven’t been learnt.
1. Intentional lost of contact: Three of the 9/11 hijacked aircraft had their transponders switched off because aircraft-transponders work not automated (like the Automatic Identification System [AIS] on the merchant ships) but can arbitrarily be controlled by humans. Not only transponders but also all other communication systems aboard the Boeing can be manually switched off. As whoever was in control of Flight MH 370 cruising over the Bay of Thailand and during the following seven more hours the missing airliner had continued flying on its unusual unplanned route far off course diverted from its original flight path, he could hide plane’s track, mask it’s altitude and camouflage it’s identification by switching off the transponder and all the other radio links including the (realize via SATCOM/INMARSAT) Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS), making so the plane out of reach, invisible for air-traffic controllers and potentially dangerous for public safety. Three separate communication systems have been disabled manually to mask plane’s location, to avoid detection and to hide it from radars and satellites. The backup transponder hasn’t been automatically activated, because nobody at Boeing was worry about it. All equipment enabling the plane to be tracked was wilful disabled. The radio communication between the cockpit of MH 370 and air traffic controllers was broken: Both, air-traffic personnel and pilots of other aircraft, were trying to contact Malaysian 370 by radio but failing to reach the plane. Apparently it is nowadays dead easy for everyone to convert an airliner into a civilian stealth bomber.
2. Danger of shooting down: These circumstances led to the danger for this now unidentified flying aircraft with 239 people on board crossing eventually the airspace of such countries like Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia in the opposite direction to MH 370 scheduled route and breaching theirs air defence, because it could have been shoot down by the military – especially (if the plane would have flown at a low altitude) by the U.S. Navy Drunken Seventh Fleet operating in the eastern Indian Ocean according to its area of responsibility – as already happened over the Persian Gulf with the Iran Air Flight IR 655 (an Airbus 330B2-203 carrying 290 people), mistaken shot down on July 3, 1988 by the drunken crew of USS Vincennes; as already happened in other cases: e.g. Libyan Airlines Flight 114 on Feb. 21, 1973 over Sinai (a Boeing 727 shot down by Israelis, 118 people aboard died); Korean Air Flight 007 (a Boeing 747 with 269 people on board) shot down on September 1, 1983 by Soviets near Sakhalin, all died. Some countries overreact to a violation of theirs airspace. So this story could happen again during the flight MH 370.
3. Danger of hijacking-crash-attack: Although an unidentified flying object has been seen by military-radars of the Malaysian, Thai and other Air Forces, no reaction by them to intercept this fly or even to communicate this incident between the countries in this region took place. The aircraft would easily have fly in the event of a hijacking terrorist background into the Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur or anywhere else, as we have seen on 9/11. A new terrorist attack with the help of the hijacked Boeing was at any time possible. But who cared?
4. Danger of crash with other plane: Because transponders broadcast aircraft’s heading, altitude, speed and identification code to the ground assistance and beyond it they warn other nearby planes of theirs course and altitude, the lack of reporting such basic anti-collision data could have lead to the crash with an other plane. Who was in the duty to take action? Malaysia, Thailand, India and Indonesia – but all the Asian Paper Tiger failed.
5. Danger of crash with a ship: MH 370 flown first over the Bay of Thailand, than it crossed the Malaysian Peninsula, flown after that across the Strait of Malacca (one of the busiest shipping route of the world) than at the north-western coast of Sumatra and finally south across the Indian Ocean towards Australia. With its cruising speed of 990 kph and its mass of 300-ton was the unidentified plane out of control a potential danger for the shipping. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) was responsible for maritime SECURITÉ warnings to ALL SHIPS over NAVTEX and INMARSAT concerning the NAVAREA X according to the GMDSS-Regulations and the international maritime law. The same regulations obligated to the same kind of warnings for the NAVAREA XI (Japan) and the NAVAREA VIII (India). India, Japan and Australia failed miserably at Dec. 26, 2004 because of gross negligent omission the SECURITÉ warnings of the impending tsunami. Their common mess lead to the same failure on March 8, 2014. Failing states!
6. Shoddy control practice and security precautions at the airport: Two passengers boarded illegal Flight 370 with fake travel documents using stolen passports despite the data have been storage in the Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database – a typical bureaucratic mess and careless work at the Kuala Lumpur airport and the same as 10 years ago on 9/11 2001 in America.
7. Lack of video-footage: Looking back at other disasters:
1) On July 25, 2000 the Flight 4590 (a Concorde flight operated by the poubelle aérienne named Air France) ended only minutes after the take-off crashing into a Hotel near the airport in Gonesse (113 people died). During the takeoff the aircraft was already on fire and the rolling plane spewed on the runway a large plume of flame. The Concorde, a highly dangerous not safe operated plane, had more than 70 incidents involving tyres between 1979 and 2000, but the producer, the Air France and the airport operating authority have failed to take appropriate steps to avoid the coming disaster. Bursting tyres lead as a rule to a serious incident or to a crash. The most important questions during the investigation were: When and where exactly caught the plane fire? Did the pilot immediately know about it and could he directly stop the plane? If not: Why the start on the runway in this case of fire hasn’t been broken off automatically? And: Has the airport operator made his duty and checked the runway for lying dangerous trash and scrap before giving clear ready for takeoff? Nobody could answer these most important questions because there were no video surveillance cameras along the runway. Everything what the investigators had to theirs disposal were two private photos (accidental making by two tourists) of the burning plane. Everybody knows that the most likely time of a crash is the phase of starting and landing on or near the runway. But no one surveillance video of Flight 4590 at the airport in Paris exists.
Risks of terror lead the most developed countries to install video cameras in almost each toilet room. Our ministers of interior run amok when it comes to installing of millions of video-cameras everywhere in the public urban areas. So it is for example not possible in London to go for a piss under a tree without having seen by all the cameras at each corner. But no one camera was in place on July 2000 in Paris in a such security sensitive area like the Charles de Gaulle Airport. Almost each fast food stand in the U.S. is monitored by video-cameras. But obviously no one was installed for the purpose of monitoring the most important building in Washington for the U.S. defence capability: the Pentagon. The Pentagon monitors the globe and each bit of men’s trace in internet but obviously not the Pentagon itself (!). Therefore, after the Fly AA 77 crashed into Pentagon, no one surveillance video of the crash was available and published, till now. Nothing surprises me anymore, to be exact neither in Europe nor in America. Everywhere we will find the same pigsty or even much worst. So it would not surprise if there is no one video camera in the cockpit of the Boeing or the Airbus.
2) An Airbus A320-233 of the TAM Airlines (Flight 3054) from Porto Alegre to São Paulo, Brazil on July 17, 2007 overran the runway at São Paulo and crashed into a nearby warehouse adjacent to a Shell gas filling station. All 181 people on board were killed, along with 12 people on the ground - the deadliest air disaster in Brazilian territory, and the deadliest aviation accident involving an Airbus A320 anywhere in the world. The aircraft was equipped with thrust reversers to help slow the airplane down on landing and break on the runway. Surveillance videos showed that the aircraft was touching down at the normal touch-down point on the runway, but it did not slow down normally, crossing the far end of the runway at a high speed, then bearing to the left, continued off the runway and exploded on impact with a facility. More than two years after the accident, the Brazilian investigation authority announced the results of official investigations. The report shows that one of the thrust levers, which control engines, the right one, was in position to accelerate when it should be in the idle-position. The pilots mistakenly retarded only the left engine to idle. The resulting asymmetric thrust condition resulted in a loss of control and a crash. Two experienced pilots (sitting both in cockpit) having each one over 14 000 hours flying praxis could not keep under control the aircraft because no clear and understandable warnings - which had to be given by the fly control system - for this elementary and security relevant situation have been provided and to heard. The question about which factors – flight control logic system failure, or pilots failure, or both – played the main role and caused the accident could not be answered definitely because of lack the video surveillance in cockpit. This kind of data could reliable answer which configuration of error and failure has been taken place and lead quickly to the right conclusions. In fact it was an evident primary failure of the aircraft manufacturer that led subsequently to the secondary pilot error.
3) An Air France Flight 447 (Airbus A330-203), from Rio de Janeiro to Paris on June 1, 2009 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. The aircraft broke up on impact; everyone on board died (228 passengers, aircrew and cabin crew from 32 countries aboard the Airbus). The accident was the deadliest in the history of Air France and also the Airbus A330's deadliest fatal accident. The investigation was hampered because the aircraft's black boxes, the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) were not recovered from the ocean floor until May 2011, nearly two years later, although the transmission by ACARS, 4 minutes before the crash, contained a set of last coordinates. The final investigation report, released on 5th July 2012 concluded that the aircraft crashed after inconsistencies between the airspeed measurements caused the autopilot to disconnect, after which the crew reacted incorrectly and ultimately led the aircraft to a crash. Correct? Certainly not in the required clearness!
Out of control: Flight 447 was crewed by three pilots: a captain and two first officers. Two co-pilots was sitting in the cockpit during the plain was coming in a bad weather front. The first one, a pilot not flying (PNF), sitting on the left side (6540 flying hours, 4500 at Airbus) and the second one, the pilot flying (PF) on the right side (3000 flying hours, 800 at Airbus). The captain left the cockpit to rest at 02:01. About ten minutes later (1.5 minutes after the autopilot was deactivated) he re-entered the cockpit and stayed there mentally disorientated until the crash. Why could it be possible? After breaking down a one (or more) speed-measure instrument(s) it was coming to a different and conflicting airspeed measurements. This inconsistency caused the automatically switching off the autopilot: the beginning of the end. Within 4 minutes the wings lost lift because pilots continued making nose-up inputs and the angle of attack rapidly increased – the aircraft was oriented nose-up but descending steeply. The aircraft (without any structural damage and with normal functioning engines) was in free fall like a stone dropping from 11.600 m at a vertical speed of 200 km/h and after only 3.5 minutes at a speed over ground of 200 km/h struck at a speed of 280 km/h in a normal flight attitude the ocean. No measures for a sea landing have been taken. The aircraft sent before the crash (between 02:10 UTC and 02:14 UTC) a series of electronic messages: 6 failure reports (FLR) and 19 warnings (WRN) were transmitted. These messages, posted to cockpit and sent from an onboard monitoring, testing and reporting system via the ACARS and the INMARSAT-AOR satellite to the Air France, indicate a fault in the speed data system. Experts said that "Piloting becomes very difficult, near impossible, without reliable speed data." The following 24 failure messages and warnings resulted from equipment failure concerned navigation, auto-flight and flight control and the reaction of crew immediately afterwards present the impressive, in fact shocking and dreadful, reconstruction of this fatal accident.
Chaos in the cockpit (A combination of more factors is the explanation why a modern airliner piloting by a crew of three pilots could turn within 4 minutes in a peace of lead and had fallen into the ocean fully intact neither due to mechanical failure nor the aircraft has being overwhelmed by the weather, but because the flight crew had raised the aircraft's nose, reducing its speed until it entered an aerodynamic stall):
24 OPTICAL WARNINS:
02:10 WARNING AUTO FLT AP OFF | WARNING AUTO FLT | WARNING F/CTL ALTN LAW | WARNING FLAG ON CAPT PFD (PFD = Primary flight display) |WARNING FLAG ON F/O PFD | WARNING AUTO FLT A/THR OFF | WARNING NAV TCAS FAULT | WARNING FLAG ON CAPT PFD/WARNING FLAG ON F/O PFD | WARNING F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT (rudder travel limiter fault) | WARNING MAINTENANCE STATUS | WARNING MAINTENANCE STATUS FAILURE EFCS2 1 (Electronic Flight Control System 2) | FAILURE EFCS1 X2 | WARNING FLAG ON CAPT PFD | WARNING FLAG ON F/O PFD | WARNING NAV ADR DISAGREE (Discrepancy in Navigation ADR: Air-Data-Reference-Systems) | FAILURE ISIS 1 (Integrated Standby Instrument) | FAILURE IR2 1, EFCS1X, IR1, IR3 | WARNING F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT | WARNING F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT | 02:14 WARNING MAINTENANCE STATUS | FAILURE AFS (Automatic Flight System) | WARNING ADVISORY … CRASH! All were immediately killed.
75 AUDIBLE “STALL WARNINGS” have been heard in cockpit at this time without the pilots became aware of that fact of immediately vital emergency and without any adequate reaction by them to counteract.
PILOT’S REACTIONS (Translation into German):
02:08 Sind wir uns einig, dass wir manuell fliegen?
02:10 Ich habe die Steuerung. - Okay. - Was ist das denn? - Wir haben keine korrekte… Wir haben keine korrekte Geschwindigkeitsanzeige. - Nun haben wir sie also verloren, die, die, die Geschwindigkeiten? - Achte auf deine Geschwindigkeit. Achte auf deine Geschwindigkeit. - OK, OK, ich gehe wieder in den Sinkflug. - Stabilisiere…- Ja. - Sink wieder… Wir sind dabei weiter zu steigen, ihm zufolge… ihm zufolge steigst du, also sink wieder. - Okay. - Sink wieder! - Und los geht's, wir sinken wieder. - Vorsichtig! - Wir sind im… ja, wir sind im "climb" (Steigflug). - Verdammt, wo ist er… ähm? Verdammt! - Ich bin in volle Kraft voraus, ja? - Verdammt, kommt er oder kommt er nicht? Wir haben immer noch die Motoren! Was zum Teufel ist da los? Ich verstehe nicht, was da geschieht. - Verdammt, ich habe keine Kontrolle mehr über das Flugzeug, ich habe keine Kontrolle mehr über das Flugzeug! - Die Steuerung nach links! - Capt.: Eh… Was macht ihr da? - Wir verlieren die Kontrolle über das Flugzeug! - Wir haben komplett die Kontrolle über das Flugzeug verloren. Das ist vollkommen unverständlich… Wir haben alles versucht… - Was glaubst du? Was glaubst du? Was müssen wir tun? - Capt.: Nun, ich weiß es nicht! - Zieh hoch… zieh hoch… zieh hoch… zieh hoch… - Aber ich ziehe doch die ganze Zeit über voll hoch! - Capt.: Nein, nein, nein… zieh nicht hoch… nein, nein. - Dann geh in den Sinkflug… Also, gib mir die Steuerung… Die Steuerung an mich! - Verdammt, wir werden aufschlagen… Scheiße, das ist nicht wahr!
02:14 - Aber was geschieht hier? - Capt.: Neigung 10 Grad... AUFPRALL!
Für den Unfall waren folgende Ereignisse ursächlich:
· Die Geschwindigkeitssensoren vereisten.
· Die von den Rechnern identifizierte Unstimmigkeit der Geschwindigkeitssensoren (sprich unterschiedliche also unzuverlässige Geschwindigkeitsmesswerte) führte zur automatischen Abschaltung/Deaktivierung des Autopilots durch den Bordcomputer.
· Die Piloten nahmen den Verlust der Geschwindigkeitsanzeigen, die Abschaltung des Autopilots und seinen Übergang in den Modus „Alternate Law“ zur Kenntnis, wussten aber nicht, was in dieser Situation richtigerweise zu tun gewesen wäre. Alarmsignale wurden von Anfang an als irrelevant betrachtet und nicht beachtet. Allein diese Situation überforderte also die Piloten hoffnungslos. Die gravierenden Folgen des Wechsels der Steuerelektronik in den Modus „Alternate Law“ ohne jedes Anstellwinkel-Schutzsystem wurden von den Piloten nicht erkannt und verstanden (In diesem Modus verhindert die Flugsteuerungssoftware offenbar nicht, dass der Pilot das Flugzeug gegebenenfalls außerhalb der Grenze der Flugfähigkeit bringt).
· Obwohl die Piloten die Steuerung nicht betätigten, rollte das Flugzeug innerhalb von zwei Sekunden um 8,4 Grad nach rechts (vermutlich wegen Turbulenzen).
· Nun haben die Piloten versucht, das Flugzeug wieder per Hand unter Kontrolle zu bekommen und zu halten. Die Steuermanöver des Piloten waren jedoch unangemessen, überzogen, kontraproduktiv und falsch und bestanden aus einem Hochziehen des Flugzeugs und aus Aktionen am Steuerknüppel, die sich gegenseitig konterkarierten. Dies war darauf zurückzuführen, dass eine technisch hochgefährliche Absurdität bei der Steuerung von Airbus eingebaut ist nämlich, wenn von der Airline den Piloten nicht einmal eine klare Rollenverteilung bei der manuellen Flugzeugsteuerung beigebracht wird (wie im vorliegendem Fall) und beide gleichzeitig an eigenem Steuerknüppel fummeln (wie im vorligendem Fall), kann es durchaus passieren, dass der eine versucht die Maschine hochzuziehen und der andere dabei genau das Gegenteil tut (wie im vorliegendem Fall), was dazu führt, dass sich beide Aktionen gegenseitig aufheben: Wie es scheint also, grob fahrlässig konstruierte Steuerungstechnik!
· Es fehlten visuelle Informationen, die eine Bestätigung des Strömungsabrisses ermöglicht hätten. Die ausgegebene Überziehwarnung („stall warning“) wurde von der Besatzung ignoriert. Der Anstellwinkel des Flugzeugs wurde den Piloten nicht direkt angezeigt, weshalb keiner der Piloten die Überziehsituation und somit die Gefahr des Absturzes erkannt hat.
· Die vom System ausgegebenen massiven Warnungen, deren Sinn und Ernsthaftigkeit von den Piloten nicht verstanden wurde (weshalb sie von der Besatzung ignoriert wurden), führten zu einer hohen emotionalen Belastung der beiden Piloten und stifteten Verwirrung statt Hilfe zu leisten und adäquate Lösungen anzubieten.
· Infolge des überzogenen Hochziehens des Flugzeugs, kam es zu einem Strömungsabriss, das Flugzeug sackte ab und fiel innerhalb kurzer Zeit wie ein Stein vom Himmel.
Ungeachtet der
· evidenten technische Unzulänglichkeiten des Flugzeugs
· der eklatanten Versäumnissen der Airline, die Piloten entsprechend zu trainieren (Ausbildung für manuelle Steuerung in großer Höhe und wie auf Geschwindigkeitsanomalien zu reagieren ist)
· unterlassener Berücksichtigung des Risikos, das aus einer Vereisung der Pitot-Sonden erwächst, seitens der für die Sicherheit zuständigen Stellen und der damit verbundenen Konsequenzen, die auch von den Piloten weder erkannt noch verstanden wurden
· fehlerhaften Anzeigen der Steuerelektronik die dazu führten, dass die Piloten Angaben der Flugkommandoanzeigen befolgten, die die Besatzung in ihren Aktionen bestätigten, obwohl sie falsch waren, sah der Saftladen namens BEA in sträflicher Art und Weise einen Pilotenfehler als primäre Ursache für den Absturz.
Schon bei der Untersuchung des Concorde-Absturzes versagte dieser staatsgelenkte Augiasstall jämmerlich. Zur Erinnerung: Wenige Minuten nach dem Start des bereits brennenden Flugzeugs, das in Frankreich hergestellt und von der Air France betrieben wurde und in Paris gestartet war, zerschellte es wenige Minuten nach dem Start in einem Feuerball mit über 100 Insassen an Bord. Es bedarf einer beispielslosen Wahrheitsverdrehung seitens der BEA sowie Rabulistik und Rechtsbeugung des anschließend involvierten französischen Gerichts, um die Verantwortung und Schuld für die Katastrophe (so absurd und unverfroren es auch klingen mag) nicht bei den Franzosen selbst zu suchen sondern den Amerikanern (!) in die Schuhe zu schieben.
In dem Air-France-Flight-447-Untersuchungsbericht hat die BEA auch fälschlich keine andere Ursache als das Überziehen des Flugzeugs während der manuellen Steuerung und der daraus folgende Strömungsabriss genannt, obgleich gerade die mittelbaren Ursachen für den Absturz von entscheidender Bedeutung waren und zu dieser vermeidbaren Katastrophe führten. Chesley B. Sullenberger, Sachverständiger für Flugunfälle, ist der Ansicht, dass der Unfall in einer Boeing mit geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit geschehen wäre. Während Airbus seine Cockpits mit Sidesticks ausstattet, verwendet Boeing im Gegensatz dazu klassische Steuerhörner. Diese sind mechanisch gekoppelt, die Sidesticks bei Airbus jedoch nicht. In einem Cockpit mit Steuerhörnern ist jede Steuereingabe des einen Piloten somit für den anderen Piloten klar sichtbar, überdies wird das Steuerhorn bei jeder Eingabe auch vergleichsweise stark bewegt. Bei Airbus reicht jedoch schon eine vergleichsweise geringe Positionsänderung des Sidesticks aus, um die Ruder von einer neutralen Position zum Vollausschlag zu bringen.
Videoaufnahmen vom Geschehen im Cockpit, die bekanntlich fehlten, hätten bei der Erforschung des Unfallhergangs gleich für Klarheit gesorgt und die lange andauernde Zusammensetzung aller Puzzlesteine überflüssig gemacht.
But the airline pilots and the pilots unions mean, a 300-ton-plane carrying hundreds of people is theirs private sweet home and not a workplace. The airline pilots mean flight deck must be seen like a restroom and not a workroom and further safety measures are not necessary. *) see a WSJ-article below.
8. Risk of fire: Potentially flammable batteries, identified as lithium-ion, were on board. There was a risk of fire or a danger of explosion. This danger has been cast to the winds. A similar case: In May 11, 1996 a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 (a ValuJet Flight 592), crashes in the Everglades near Miami, Florida, because oxygen generators in its cargo hold caught fire. All 110 people on board were killed. Someone neglected one’s duty and offended against safety regulations.
9. No action for lack of co-operation: Lack of co-operation in sharing intelligence caused the tsunami massacre 2004 in Thailand and in other Indian Ocean Rim countries. Ten years later there was a similar picture of criminal failure. But who speaks about this failure, the second one after the tsunami disaster 2004. U.S. Air Force and Australian Air Force, their intelligence agencies and military facilities, wasted billions of fiscal money a year, haven’t done their job. They have a big trap, boast of theirs capabilities and claimed, they would control the airspace over the Indian Ocean and keep there all under control. Among them: the National Security Agency (NSA), the Diego Garcia Command, the National Geospatial Agency (NGO), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) – the Australian are especially busy with the surveillance the Asians south-east side and look after to remain in control of the situation. Otherwise we could see how in the region the involved Royal Asian Paper Tiger Air Forces work: they completely failed the one more than the other. They were unable to detect the plane and eventually to prevent its strike in the ocean. India, an other basket case, was not able to communicate the flight through near the Car Nicobar Island, where is an Indian air force base situated. The USA, Russia, China, India, Japan, France, the UK, Thailand and others should already have had all data on the true track the missing aircraft during its fly using theirs high-resolution satellite imagery. But they were reluctant to share any disaster relevant information that could potentially reveal or shied light on their defence capabilities. Submarines patrolling the Indian Ocean or SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) with its hydroacustic facilities should have information in the event of a water impact. After the tsunami disaster 2004 it was claimed that the Pentagon knows about all what in the Indian Ocean happen: "If somewhere in the ocean a herring coughs," said 2005 a Pentagon official proudly, "we we’ll hear it." Nothing but hot air?
10. Looking for a needle in a bottle hay: Lack of urgent action by authorities, international regulators, manufacturer, airlines and insurers
· to change safety and security procedures regarding global tracking of flight information via satellite uplink;
· to enhance the ability to locate a missing aircraft;
· to avoid the inability to locate quick and reliable a plane in a case of an emergency;
· to avoid the inability to focused search and rescue missions;
· lack of urgent action by the airline industry to ensure a reliable global tracking of SAR-relevant aircraft-operations and communication data that can’t be deliberately disabled or deactivated
and in the particular MH 370 case of emergency
lack of reliable information, lack of essential track data that could help to determine the flight path the plane have travelled and the inability to locate the plane after flying thousands of kilometres off course
· created a basic uncertainty whether the plane reached an alternative destination or it ultimately crashed;
· created a basic uncertainty whether the aircraft crashed over land or at sea;
· widened in the beginning a target zone up to two dozen countries and the potential search area by thousands on square kilometres;
· hindered to narrow the search (searching path from the border of Kazakhstan to the southern Indian Ocean) and to estimate where Flight 370 might crashed: on shallow seas or maybe on land or have struck in a deep and remote area of the Indian Ocean: 26 nations were involving in searching an area covering some million square nautical miles of ocean and land;
· made a multinational search effort focused on a specific search area impossible: searchers were still looking in the wrong places; hundreds of pieces that was first identified as aircraft debris was identified later as a drifted junk in the ocean;
· failed efficient SAR operations involving navy and merchant ships, patrol aircraft, expert teams and investigators from more then two dozen countries searching for survivors, wreckage and answers;
· wasted weeks of the time and made the following search actions total ineffective at last.
Imprecise, incomplete, muddled or inaccurate information, intransparency, release of contradictory information and conflicting explanations about
· weather the plane flown over the countries coming into question or travelled near the border of those countries,
· response to questions about radar and satellite data concerning the flight,
· when exactly the plane eventually could went down and where exactly it might have struck the ocean,
and beyond that multiple false leads, lack of information from authorities, information delay, contrary misleading information (civilian officials sometimes contradicting military leaders), contradicting statements of authorities and even their lies delayed the search efforts, have made multi-national search operation chaotically and the hunt for any sign of Flight 370 extremely difficult. Even weeks after Flight 370 vanished, too many questions couldn’t be answered, which worsened the emotional condition of the passengers’ relatives. It was for search teams impossible to locate precise the impact site and the wreck of the missing plane, till now. And they have no credible leads helping the search for Flight 370. Over time all important questions couldn’t be answered in the appropriate time and manner. The governmental information policy of all involved parties was a disaster after disaster – the same pattern of failure like after the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004.
11. Being short of time: Under all these conditions it was still impossible to speed up the search looking precisely directed on the ocean floor for the plane’s black boxes (flight-recorder and voice recorder) before they stop emitting signals. They recorded crucial data about aircraft operations during the flight, which should explain what happened on the plane. The chances of finding the black boxes diminish with each day because its batteries will stop working in several days. After elapse this time could be however hard or impossible to find the flight recorders and find out what happened. Lack of crucial early multinational detective work and co-operation could than come to a bad end in records lost – the end of the story.
12. Hampered investigations and cover-up: Every piece of information on the Flight and Voice Data Recorders that should be recovering after a crash is important to analyse the accident and to avoid similar accidents in the future. Unfortunately the most involved parties did their utmost to obstruct and to stop these efforts and do it on and on so far. The same pattern of failure we observed after the tsunami 2004.
How could this still be possible?
If there is a reasonable explanation we would be grateful to hear it.
Apparently have Boeing, as the aircraft builder, the FAA,
as the supervising American authority for aircraft and the air security,
and all the others in responsibility, failed.
The lessons from past disasters haven’t been learnt at home and abroad.
We, the victims and survivors of the man-made tsunami massacre in Thailand Dec. 26, 2004, remember the lacking safety and risk management at this time. We claim the total U.S. lack of response (early urgent warnings and alerts) to the impending deadly and devastating tsunami 2004 that smashed the coasts of the Indian Ocean and killed thousands of tourists. We claim the lack of any response to the impending disaster by all high-developed countries as well. They have had all the technology and personnel to respond quickly and efficient. But nothing has been done to avoid the coming tsunami massacre. We urge the lack of effective reaction and consequences, till now. The following tsunami disasters: three in Indonesia, three in the west Pacific (Solomon Is., Samoa) two in Chile and one in Japan 2011 (a tsunami and nuclear disaster, as a result of that 20 000 people had to die) could only happen because no lessons have been learned from the big tsunami disaster 2004. At that time some of tsunami survivors hat to die because of lack of timely and proper medical assistance. Ten years on even someone has survived the crash no one survivor of the disaster had the chance to be still alive. In the case of Tsunami-Massacre 2004 all was going wrong in handling and response the crisis. Thailand’s authorities in Bangkok detected the correct quake data and they knew about the danger of tsunami but they warned nobody, wasted the time and waited until the tsunami hit the coasts. Thailand waited 10 days now to tell Malaysia: We have some relevant radar information concerning the Flight MH 370. In fact, nobody has played worst-case scenarios now and ten years ago and was asking if it happens: What is our response? How is to manage communication between our authorities and to other governments and organisations? Do we have the proper organisation to respond effectively to the crisis? Advanced technology was in place ten years ago and it is in place now. But we have now to do with the same kind of SNAFU. After the mega quake on Dec. 26, 2004 satellite imagery have could helped to establish the whole picture. But the information resulting from high-resolution satellite imagery of spy satellites the NSA which detected the triggered tsunami waves and theirs horrific impact on the coasts of Sumatra hasn’t been shared. The same denial to share disaster-relevant information could be identified as the NSA rejected to share this kind of information now. Everybody knows: The surveillance of the Indian Ocean obliges the U.S. Navy. But the U.S. Navy with its strategic marine base on Diego Garcia remained silent and invisible as the devastating and deadly tsunami 2004 was rolling across the Indian Ocean and its beaches.
So we identify in this case a similar range of inability to act, of bureaucratic incompetence to timely and proper reaction, of inefficiency by governmental authorities and theirs gross negligence to prevent man-made disasters. Victims of the MH 370 tragedy and we too don’t know by now what exactly happened because the published information remains unclear, inconsistent or fragmentary. But we all know already just enough to say:
That what has happened is a criminal scandal.
Both, the man-made tsunami massacre 2004
and the aftermath of the Flight MH 379 disaster
are a shame for the mankind.
These circumstances should worry everyone. Since America claimed to be in the driving seat and to control the moral high ground, since America is already de facto the world government it should fully assume their role, not hide itself and openly take over. Otherwise we’ll continue to see this picture of incompetence where clowns are running the show. What is now to be done? I suggest the first what would be necessary to do is brain work to seek the right solution. So put all your highly competent brain worker together: all the deadbeats, pinheads, baskets, lame and dead ducks, piss artists, highly honoured good-for-nothing wastrel, do-nothing manager, academically educated experts in thinking about nothing, Pentagons mentally retarded pen pushers, lobotomized brain damaged scientists, probability mentalists, and eventually other not burnout-syndrom-affected mental gambler. Don’t forget to involve in your brainstorming-process the jerks and sheepheads from the think mixed-tank named PTWC/NOAA and ask Andrew Hirshorn in Honolulu and your admiral Conrad Lautenbacher in Washington for help. As the Earth shook on Boxing Day by the mega-quake of an extraordinary magnitude, the first one said: As far as I am concerned the quake seemed for me to be so far away, it could just have taken place on the moon. Concerning the lack of tsunami warnings by the NOAA he said: We hadn’t got the appropriate telephone numbers in our books, none of them, sorry. And after the deadly failure of the NOAA, the second one, the boss of the NOAA exculpated himself and his piggery named the NOAA and laid like mad about the NOAA’s capability telling the public in a chat ‘Ask White House’ a pack of lies.
As you see in a case of an emergency one can relay on the American e x p e r t s; and in the follow up on theirs moral i n t e g r i t y, of course.
Because of lack the necessary changes and consequences in the commercial aviation so far, because of the huge death toll and the permanent risks for the public, because of the irresponsible bureaucratic and moral laxity the following accused handling parties according the motto ‘it’s business as usual’, it seems us necessary the US Department of Justice should take into account the mentioned basics in its investigations, hold an inquiry into the cause of the accident and take immediately judicial steps against
Boeing Co. – Airbus Group – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Luftfahrt- Bundesamt (LBA), BEA and other governmental air-safety supervisors – National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) – International Air Transport Association (IATA) – European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) – International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) – International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Association (IFALPA) – Airlines for America – Malaysia Airline/Government of Malaysia – Government of Thailand – Government of India – Government of Indonesia – Association of Asia-Pacific Airlines (AAPA) – Allianz AG (and eventually other insurers) – Munich Re AG (and eventually other re-insurers) – National Security Agency (NSA) – U.S. Navy Drunken Seventh Fleet – Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) – Diego Garcia Command – National Geospatial Agency (NGO) – Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) – Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) – Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) – Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) – Australian Royal Air Force – Australian Royal Navy
Who was criminally responsible for the disaster? In our opinion they are above the major links in the chain of failure. They haven’t understand the need to learn its own lessons, they have failed at their jobs and are to blame for the accident and for
- lack of moving to act on lessons learned,
- lack of urgent action by regulators to set global standards in the event of an emergency and to prevent events of air-traffic emergency,
- lack of safety improvements despite the technology already exists, that can ensure or enhance the ability to locate a missing aircraft,
- lack of properly security measures at airports,
- didn’t act correctly in the emergency,
- heightening hazards for air traffic,
- increasing threats to public safety
- lax handling of air-safety requirements,
- irresponsible acting according the dictum ‘it’s business as usual’
- lax readiness to help enlighten the course of events,
- cover-up over the circumstances and withholding important information about the disaster from public leading to the obstruction ongoing investigations of the accident.
We believe these are facts and indications enough to charge the accused.
Everyone should pay for irresponsible negligence!
Sincerely,
Jerzy Chojnowski
(Chairman-GTVRG e.V.)
www.gtvrg.de
PS. By the way: Both, Boeing Co. and Airbus Group, as aircraft manufacturer didn’t respond to our requests for comment on the matter.
*************************************************************
German Tsunami Victims Response Group e.V.
was established as a non-profit tsunami victims organisation
acting worldwide to prevent man-made disasters
Account for Donations:
www.gtvrg.de
*************************************************************
Suche nach MH370-Jet wird eingestellt
![Graffito zum Gedenken an die Opfer im malaysischen Shah Alam nahe der Hauptstadt Kuala Lumpur (Archivbild)]({"default":{"load":"default","w":"73","h":"41","src":"//img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/AAlVXXY.img?h=410&w=728&m=6&q=60&o=f&l=f&x=346&y=225"},"size3column":{"load":"default","w":"62","h":"35","src":"//img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/AAlVXXY.img?h=352&w=624&m=6&q=60&o=f&l=f&x=346&y=225"},"size2column":{"load":"default","w":"62","h":"35","src":"//img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/AAlVXXY.img?h=352&w=624&m=6&q=60&o=f&l=f&x=346&y=225"}})
© picture-alliance/AP Photo/J. Paul Graffito zum Gedenken an die Opfer im malaysischen Shah Alam nahe der Hauptstadt Kuala Lumpur (Archivbild) Bereits vor zwei Wochen hatte der malaysische Verkehrsminister Liow Tiong Lai angekündigt, die Maßnahmen bald zu beenden. Die Hoffnung, bis dahin das Flugzeugwrack noch zu finden, erfüllte sich nicht.
Stundenlang gen Süden
Flug MH370 war am 8. März 2014 aus bislang ungeklärter Ursache auf der Strecke von Kuala Lumpur nach Peking vom Kurs abgewichen. Dann verloren die Bodenstationen jeglichen Kontakt zu dem Jumbo. Nach Satellitenauswertungen nehmen Experten an, dass die Maschine mit 239 Insassen stundenlang Richtung Süden flog. Die Boeing 777 dürfte abgestürzt sein, als der Treibstoff ausging.
Unter Leitung der australischen Verkehrssicherheitsbehörde ATSB konzentrierte sich die Suche auf ein etwa 120.000 Quadratkilometer großes Meeresgebiet im Indischen Ozean. Laut einem im Dezember veröffentlichten ATSB-Bericht könnte das Flugzeug allerdings weiter nördlich abgestürzt sein. Die internationale Opfervereinigung Voice370 vermutet schon seit längerem, dass in einem falschen Gebiet nach der Maschine gesucht wurde. Sie hatte die Regierungen Malaysias, Australiens und Chinas nach Veröffentlichung der ATSB-Analyse aufgefordert, die Suche auszuweiten.
jj/stu (dpa, afp, ap)
