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Sonntag, 31. März 2019

PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC SCAM






The world of science - which in the present case meticulously reveals a small and insignificant fraud in its own ranks - shedding her crocodile's tears here has not responded till now to the biggest and most fatal frauds and scams ever made by its pseudo-scientists. 
This was the subsumption of the man-made tsunami disaster Christmas 2004, caused in the first place by geoscientists, as an unavoidable natural disaster
The scientific Pearl Harbor and the related shame  for all eternity began on December 26, 2004 at 8 o'clock Bangkok time ... and continue to this day. The name Pearl Harbor is still used today in the US as a synonym for a scathing attack without any warning. But since the tsunami disaster of 2004, it has been a metaphor for the attack on the historical truth by people who were supposed to serve the truth but who conspired against it. These people have attacked and raped the truth with their truth-destroying and cover-up disinformation campaigns and cover-ups. They are called journalists and scientists ... but actually they should be called lying scribblers and pseudo-scientists.
Some might say it was the next cover-up that accompanied a crime against humanity. And we say it was a turning point in the history of the West on its way to its demise. A civilization that relies on lies and falsehood has no chance to survive.
Jerzy Chojnowski
Chairman-GTVRG e.V.
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Scientific fraud announced in two studies of the 2016 M=7.0 Kumamoto, Japan, earthquake


By Ross S. Stein, Ph.D., Temblor CEO
In one case, the fault rupture and its associated seismicity had been shifted toward a volcano in support of the author’s hypothesis; in the other, seismograms from temporary near-fault stations had been manufactured. In both cases, evaluation committees and universities called for retractions.
Citation: Ross S. Stein (2019), Scientific fraud announced in two studies of the 2016 M=7.0 Kumamoto, Japan, earthquake, Temblor, http://doi.org/10.32858/temblor.018
On Tuesday, March 26, Kyoto University held a press conference to announce that a panel of outside experts had concluded that Prof. Aiming Lin of Kyoto University had fabricated, mislocated, distorted, and misrepresented data in a paper published in the journal, Science, in October/November 2016. Endorsing the conclusion of the panel, the University called for the paper to be retracted by Science. Retraction has, so far, has not occurred, nor has Science published an ‘Editorial Expression of Concern’ which can appear when the integrity of a paper is questioned.
Prof. Lin told the investigation committee that he made careless mistakes because he was not accustomed to using drawing software, but he argued that the paper’s conclusion—that the 2016 rupture was arrested by the Aso volcano—was nevertheless correct. The Evaluation Committee and University administration respectfully disagreed. The Kyoto University administration stated in the press conference that while Prof. Lin would be subject to unspecified disciplinary actions, the investigation committee had exonerated his five coauthors on the study, four of whom also are associated with Kyoto University.
What is Prof. Lin accused of doing?
Lin et al. based their argument on the 2016 right-lateral fault rupture (whichever side you are on, the other side moves to the right), and its associated seismicity extending into the Aso caldera, where they contended the rupture ran into the magma body feeding the volcano, and stopped. The Lin et al. fault rupture (Sites 1 to 9, below) are seen to extend well into the caldera. But the independently mapped rupture (sites 1 to 5) terminates well outside of the caldera, contradicting Lin et al.’s argument that the magma stopped the rupture. Further, the Committee found that Site 5, which Lin et al identify as the site of peak right-lateral slip, in fact records only normal slip. Here are three key figures from the Evaluation Committee report, slightly modified for readability, and with the Japanese annotations removed.
A comparison of Lin et al. fig. 2A and the Evaluation Committee’s rectified figure on a shaded relief map. The Lin et al. rupture for the Kumamoto earthquake (black lines, above) extend into the caldera; the independently mapped rupture (red and green lines, below) do not. The caldera itself is mislocated in the Lin et al. map.
A comparison of Lin et al. fig. 2A and the Evaluation Committee’s rectified figure on a shaded relief map. The Lin et al. rupture for the Kumamoto earthquake (black lines, above) extend into the caldera; the independently mapped rupture (red and green lines, below) do not. The caldera itself is mislocated in the Lin et al. map.

The Evaluation Committee further found that the maps in Lin et al. were distorted (stretched) N-S vs. E-W, and that the caldera rim (while line above) was mis-registered by several kilometers in the Lin et al. (2016) maps. Many of the field points are mislocated in the map. For example, Lin et al. placed Site 5 on the caldera rim, but it is actually 2.8 km outside the rim. Sites 8 and 9, which Lin et al. place 1.5 km apart, are in fact 50-80 m apart.
A comparison of Lin et al. figs. 2A and 2B (middle and bottom panels) with the Evaluation Committee’s rectified and re-registered figures (top and middle panels).
A comparison of Lin et al. figs. 2A and 2B (middle and bottom panels) with the Evaluation Committee’s rectified and re-registered figures (top and middle panels).

The Evaluation Committee found that the fault slip model, from Koketsu et al. (2016), had been shifted by 5 km and rescaled, and with the epicenter repositioned 3.5 km. When rectified to its proper position, it is evident that the principal slip at depth, and not just at the surface, stopped short of the caldera, contradicting the Lin et al. thesis. Lin et al. Sites 4 and 5 are seen to lie in slip saddles (thin red lines connecting upwards to single arrowheads), not slip peaks as Lin et al. had argued Lin et al. (dashed red lines connecting downward to the double arrowheads).
A comparison of Lin et al. fig 1B with the Evaluation Committee’s superimposed boxes used by the NIED to plot seismicity cross-sections. They found that the boxes shown in Lin et al. designated by Roman numerals do not correspond to the numbered boxes used by the NIED. The base map has only one lat/lon mark, making its registration difficult and its distortion hard to detect.
A comparison of Lin et al. fig 1B with the Evaluation Committee’s superimposed boxes used by the NIED to plot seismicity cross-sections. They found that the boxes shown in Lin et al. designated by Roman numerals do not correspond to the numbered boxes used by the NIED. The base map has only one lat/lon mark, making its registration difficult and its distortion hard to detect.

Lin et al. used seismicity maps and cross-sections to argue that aftershocks accompanied the rupture into the caldera. But the Committee found that the seismicity cross-sections shown in Lin et al. figure 1B (above) were rotated clockwise by 30° and mis-located by up to 10 km eastward, giving the false impression that the active fault trace and aftershocks extended into the caldera (compare red numbered polygons with white roman-numeraled boxes above). As a result of the distortion and relocation of these cross-sections, the faults drawn in fig. 1C cross-sections do not connect to their surface traces.
Sloppiness or manipulation?
Immediately after a large damaging earthquake, field observations are difficult to conduct. Even using handheld GPS units, some mislocation of field points is possible. But the Evaluation Committee found that the mislocations and distortions altered the data in a manner to support the hypothesis of the authors, rather than as random errors associated with field reconnaissance. Deferring judgement on Prof. Lin’s intentions, they nevertheless called this fraud and falsification.
Fabricated Kumamoto seismograms by another author
On 18 March 2019, Osaka University announced that Dr. Yoshiya Hata, Associate Professor of the Graduate School of Engineering of Osaka University, faked some of the data used in at least five papers about the Kumamoto earthquake. Dr. Hata resigned his Osaka post and subsequently died. 
Although Dr. Hata claimed that he had installed a seismograph and collected the observation data shown in these papers, the Evaluation Committee empaneled by Osaka University found that he had instead fabricated the seismograms by manipulating data, essentially stretching and rescaling the wiggles of the seismogram, observed by seismographs installed by other institutes. The Investigation Committee has also determined that he falsified the theoretical calculation values to make the fabricated data appear more convincing. The Investigation Committee did not find that the co-authors were involved in the research misconduct.
The seismograms for the permanent KIK and MTO seismic stations are real; the TMP1-3 (temporary installations) seismograms are faked, and have been retracted by the journals in which they were published. The peak accelerations for the TMP stations are higher than for the others (1000-1500 Gal, or 1.0-1.5 g), which would have made them important for building design criteria.
The seismograms for the permanent KIK and MTO seismic stations are real; the TMP1-3 (temporary installations) seismograms are faked, and have been retracted by the journals in which they were published. The peak accelerations for the TMP stations are higher than for the others (1000-1500 Gal, or 1.0-1.5 g), which would have made them important for building design criteria.

In September 2017, one of Dr. Hata’s coauthors, Dr. Hiroyuki Goto from the Disaster Prevention Research Institute of Kyoto University, placed a statement on his website in Japanese and English warning that the Kumamoto seismograms contained “wide reaching errors,” errors he explained that another seismologist had brought to his attention nine months earlier, but that he had not fully investigated, for which he apologized.  
Why weren’t these errors discovered before publication?
Science depends on researchers who, when asked by journal editors, volunteer to review papers for their quality, originality, persuasiveness, and importance. Reviewers can choose to be named or anonymous when their reviews are transmitted to the authors, and they can also make comments that only the editor will see. While reviewing is a time-consuming effort that does nothing to advance one’s career, it is a collective community endeavor that scientists engage in to advance, distill, and diffuse knowledge, for which we take pride. Unlike reviewers, editors are not anonymous, but they are generally also volunteers, except at Science and Nature, where they are trained science professionals. But here’s what’s key: Most reviewers assume that the data in the manuscript are authentic; they view their role as deciding if the data support the author’s conclusions, rather than conducting a forensic analysis of its veracity. And so, reviewers, editors—and was the case here, even coauthors—can miss clues that something is not right. [Full disclosure: I am a former editor of the Journal of Geophysical Research, and former Chair of the Board of Journal Editors of the American Geophysical Union, and so dealt with fraud accusations, editor-author disputes, and co-author disputes, forwarding those deemed credible for greater scrutiny. So, many of these reviewing and editing mistakes and lapses apply to myself as well].
Self-corrective but slow
Fortunately, science is self-corrective, in the sense that a large number of subsequent papers on the Kumamoto earthquake reported results at odds with Lin et al., and took issue with its findings. But even though publication can be fast (4 months from the earthquake to publication for Hata et al, and 6 months for Lin et al), self-correction can be slow, as practiced by the journals, and by institutions of the authors that empanel evaluation committees, as is evident from the 28-month period from publication these papers to public exposure.
What next?
Papers that appear in peer-reviewed journals are not necessarily right; rather, they are not obviously wrong. While that may seem like a low bar, in fact it is a demanding and critical filter. Publications that are subsequently identified as fraudulent mislead both scientists and the public, and so must be retracted. The Hata-authored papers with the faked seismograms were retracted this week by their journals. If Lin et al. (2016) is not also retracted, the damage—both to our understanding of the Kumamoto earthquake, and to the integrity of science—will continue.
Citation: Ross S. Stein (2019), Scientific fraud announced in two studies of the 2016 M=7.0 Kumamoto, Japan, earthquake, Temblor, http://doi.org/10.32858/temblor.018
References
Asahi Shimbun (2019), ‘Kyoto academic used tampered quake charts in Science article,’ 27 March 2019, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201903270040.html
Hata, Y., Goto, H. and Yoshimi, M. (2016), Preliminary analysis of strong ground motions in the heavily damaged zone in Mashiki Town, Kumamoto, Japan, during the main shock of the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (Mw7.0) observed by a dense seismic array, Seismological Research Letters, 87, 1044-1049.
Koketsu, K., H. Kobayashi, H. Miyake (2016), “Generation process of the 14th and 16th April 2016 Kumamoto earthquakes,” http://taro.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/saigai/2016kumamoto/index.html#C.
Kyoto University Press Release and Linked Evaluation Committee Reports (26 March 2019) http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/about/events_news/office/kenkyu-suishin/kenkyu-suishin/news/2018/190326_1.html
Notice of Retraction by Seismological Research Letters (2019)
https://doi.org/10.1785/0220190066
Lin, A., T. Satsukawa, M. Wang, Z. Mohammadi Asl, R. Fueta, and F. Nakajima (2016), Coseismic rupturing stopped by Aso volcano during the 2016 Mw 7.1 Kumamoto earthquake, Japan, Science, 354, doi:10.1126/science.aah4629.
NIED Hi-Net seismicity and cross-sections associated with the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake, http://www.hinet.bosai.go.jp/topics/nw-kumamoto160416/?LANG=ja (2016)
Outline of the results of the investigation into allegations of specific research misconduct that occurred at Osaka University, 15 March 2019
RetractionWatch.com (2019), https://retractionwatch.com/2019/03/18/late-researcher-faked-kumamoto-earthquake-data-university-finds/

Freitag, 29. März 2019

MEASURING PLATE MOTION WITH GPS



Measuring Plate Motion with GPS
UNAVCO, Inc.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1m1tAGbfL4&feature=youtu.be

DISASTER RISK

Understanding Disaster Risk

Hazards do not have to turn into disasters. 

An introduction to key concepts in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)

Policies and practices for disaster risk management should be based on an understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions.
Disaster risk is expressed as the likelihood of loss of life, injury or destruction and damage from a disaster in a given period of time. 
UNISDR Global Assessment Report 2015
https://www.preventionweb.net/risk/disaster-risk

Disaster risk is widely recognized as the consequence of the interaction between a hazard and the characteristics that make people and places vulnerable and exposed.
After Typhoon Haiyan


Component of risk

What is disaster risk

Disasters are sometimes considered external shocks, but disaster risk results from the complex interaction between development processes that generate conditions of exposure, vulnerability and hazard. Disaster risk is therefore considered as the combination of the severity and frequency of a hazard, the numbers of people and assets exposed to the hazard, and their vulnerability to damage (UNISDR, 2015a). Intensive risk is disaster risk associated with low-probability, high-impact events, whereas extensive risk is associated with high-probability, low-impact events.
There is no such thing as a natural disaster, but disasters often follow natural hazards.
The losses and impacts that characterise disasters usually have much to do with the exposure and vulnerability of people and places as they do with the severity of the hazard event (UNISDR, 2013).
Disaster risk has many characteristics. In order to understand disaster risk, it is essential to understand that it is:
  • Forward looking the likelihood of loss of life, destruction and damage in a given period of time
  • Dynamic: it can increase or decrease according to our ability to reduce vulnerability
  • Invisible: it is comprised of not only the threat of high-impact events, but also the frequent, low-impact events that are often hidden
  • Unevenly distributed around the earth: hazards affect different areas, but the pattern of disaster risk reflects the social construction of exposure and vulnerability in different countries
  • Emergent and complex: many processes, including climate change and globalized economic development, are creating new, interconnected risks
Disasters threaten development, just as development creates disaster risk.
The key to understanding disaster risk is by recognizing that disasters are an indicator of development failures, meaning that disaster risk is a measure of the sustainability of development. Hazard, vulnerability and exposure are influenced by a number of risk drivers, including poverty and inequality, badly planned and managed urban and regional development, climate change and environmental degradation (UNISDR, 2009a, 2011, 2013 and 2015a).
Understanding disaster risk requires us to not only consider the hazard, our exposure and vulnerability but also society's capacity to protect itself from disasters. The ability of communities, societies and systems to resist, absorb, accommodate, recover from disasters, whilst at the same time improve wellbeing, is known as resilience.

Exposure and vulnerability turn a hazard into a disaster


Why does disaster risk matter?

If current global patterns of increasing exposure, high levels of inequality, rapid urban development and environment degradation grow, then disaster risk may increase to dangerous levels (UNISDR, 2015b).
Since 1980 1.6 billion people have been killed in disasters (UNISDR, 2015a).
Global average annual loss is estimated to increase up to US$415 billion by 2030 (UNISDR, 2015a).
As the past several decades of research have demonstrated, disasters particularly affect the poorest and most marginalised people, whilst also exacerbating vulnerabilities and social inequalities and harming economic growth (Mitchell et al., 2014). Disaster mortality risk is closely correlated with income level and quality of risk governance (UNISDR, 2015a). Although some countries have successfully reduced disaster deaths from flooding and tropical cyclones, evidence suggests that the numbers of deaths from extensive risks is increasing (UNISDR, 2015a). Increases in extensive disaster loss and damage is evidence that disaster risk is an indicator of failed or skewed development, of unsustainable economic and social processes, and of ill-adapted societies (UNISDR, 2015a).
In most economies 70-85% of overall investment is made by the private sector, which generally does not consider disaster risk in its portfolio of risks (UNISDR, 2013). Across the globe, the concentration of high-value assets in hazard areas has grown (UNISDR, 2015a). But, when disaster losses are understood relative to the income status of the country, low and middle-income countries appear to be suffering the greatest losses (UNISDR, 2015a). Disaster risk is therefore a problem for people, businesses and governments alike.

How do we measure disaster risk?

Identifying, assessing and understanding disaster risk is critical to reducing it.
We can measure disaster risk by analysing trends of, for instance, previous disaster losses. These trends can help us to gauge whether disaster risk reduction is being effective. We can also estimate future losses by conducting a risk assessment.
A comprehensive risk assessment considers the full range of potential disaster events and their underlying drivers and uncertainties. It can start with the analysis of historical events as well as incorporating forward-looking perspectives, integrating the anticipated impacts of phenomena that are altering historical trends, such as climate change. In addition, risk assessment may consider rare events that lie outside projections of future hazards but that, based on scientific knowledge, could occur. Anticipating rare events requires a range of information and interdisciplinary findings, along with scenario building and simulations, which can be supplemented by expertise from a wide range of disciplines.
Data on hazards, exposures, vulnerabilities and losses enhance the accuracy of risk assessment, contributing to more effective measures to prevent, prepare for and financially manage disaster risk (OECD, 2012). Modern approaches to risk assessment include risk modelling, which came into being when computational resources became more powerful and available (GFDRR, 2014a). Risk models allow us to simulate the outcomes and likelihood of different events.
Risk assessments are produced in order to estimate possible economic, infrastructure, and social impacts arising from a particular hazard or multiple hazards (GFDRR, 2014b). The components of assessing risk (and the associated losses) include:
  • Hazard is defined as the probability of experiencing a certain intensity of hazard (eg. Earthquake, cyclone etc) at a specific location and is usually determined by an historical or user-defined scenario, probabilistic hazard assessment, or other method. Some hazard modules can include secondary perils (such as soil liquefaction or fires caused by earthquakes, or storm surge associated with a cyclone).
  • Exposure represents the stock of property and infrastructure exposed to a hazard, and it can include socioeconomic factors.
  • Vulnerability accounts for the susceptibility to damage of the assets exposed to the forces generated by the hazard. Fragility and vulnerability functions estimate the damage ratio and consequent loss respectively, and/or the social cost (e.g., number of injured, homeless, and killed) generated by a hazard, according to a specified exposure.
Source: GFDRR (2014b)
Risk can be assessed both deterministically (single or few scenarios) and probabilistically (the likelihood of all possible events). Probabilistic models “complete” historical records by reproducing the physics of the phenomena and recreating the intensity of a large number of synthetic (computer-generated) events (UNISDR, 2015a). As such, they provide a more comprehensive picture of the full spectrum of future risks than is possible with historical data (UNISDR, 2015a). While the scientific data and knowledge used for modelling is still incomplete, provided that their inherent uncertainty is recognised, these models can provide guidance on the likely 'order of magnitude' of risks (UNISDR, 2015a).

Risk models are a representation of reality, but are only as good as the data used.

The convergence of public and private sector risk modelling efforts promises to increase the availability of open access, open source risk information that can be used by business, government, insurance and citizens alike (UNISDR, 2013). However, while the experts developing these models clearly understand their limitations, especially at subnational levels, DRR practitioners using the information produced by these models may understand these limitations less well (GFDRR, 2014a).

Though important challenges remain in assessing risk, more hazard data and models are available; tools and models for identifying, analysing, and managing risk have grown in number and utility; and risk data and tools are increasingly being made freely available to users as part of a larger global trend towards open data (GFDRR, 2014a). More generally, and in contrast to 2005, today there is a deeper understanding—on the part of governments as well as development institutions—that risk must be managed on an ongoing basis (GFDRR, 2012), and that disaster risk management requires many partners working cooperatively and sharing information (GRDRR, 2014a).

Risk information provides a critical foundation for managing disaster risk across a wide range of sectors:

In the insurance sector, the quantification of disaster risk is essential, given that the solvency capital of most non-life insurance companies is strongly influenced by their exposure to natural catastrophe risk.
In the construction sector, quantifying the potential risk expected in the lifetime of a building, bridge, or critical facility drives the creation and modification of building codes.
In the land-use and urban planning sectors, robust analysis of flood risk likewise drives investment in flood protection and possibly effects changes in insurance as well.
At the community level, an understanding of hazard events—whether from living memory or oral and written histories—can inform and influence decisions on preparedness, including life-saving evacuation procedures and the location of important facilities.
Source: GFDRR (2014a)

It is well recognized that risk is not static and that it can change very rapidly as a result of evolving hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. Decision makers therefore need to engage today on the risk they face tomorrow. Fortunately, significant new methodologies and data sets are being developed that will increasingly make modelling future risks possible (GFDRR, 2014).



How do we reduce disaster risk?
Disaster risk management (DRM) can be thought of the implementation of DRR and includes building the capacity of a community, organisation or society to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from disasters through activities related to:

Prevention
The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters (often less costly than disaster relief and response).

Mitigation
The lessening or minimizing of the adverse impacts of a hazardous event.

Risk transfer
The process of formally or informally shifting the financial consequences of particular risks from one party to another whereby a household, community, enterprise or state authority will obtain resources from the other party after a disaster occurs, in exchange for ongoing or compensatory social or financial benefits provided to that other party.

Preparedness
The knowledge and capacities of governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current disasters.

Source (UNISDR, 2017)

By understanding and managing risk, we can achieve major reductions in disaster losses (GFDRRa). For instance, by strengthening their capacities to absorb and recover from disasters, several countries across the world have reduced mortality risk associated with flooding and tropical cyclones (UNISDR, 2015a). Many high-income countries have also successfully reduced their extensive risks. However, losses associated with extensive risk are trending up in low and middle-income countries (UNISDR, 2015a)



If a country ignores disaster risk and allows risk to accumulate, it is in effect undermining its own future potential for social and economic development. However, if a country invests in disaster risk reduction, over time it can reduce the potential losses it faces, thus freeing up critical resources for development (UNISDR, 2015a).

Hazards do not have to turn into disasters.

A catastrophic disaster is not the inevitable consequence of a hazard event, and much can be done to reduce the exposure and vulnerability of populations living in areas where natural hazards occur, whether frequently or infrequently (GFDRR, 2014a). We can prevent future risk, reduce existing risk and support the resilience and societies in the face of risk that cannot be effectively reduced (known as residual risk) (UNISDR, 2015a).


Disaster risk reduction (the policy objective of disaster risk management) contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development. (UNISDR, 2017). (UNISDR, 2017). Evidence from several countries, including Colombia, Mexico and Nepal indicates that investment in disaster risk reduction is effective - there are therefore both political and economic imperatives to reducing disaster risk. Disaster risk is a shared risk, and businesses, the public sector and civil society all participate in its construction; consequently, disaster risk reduction (DRR) must be considered a shared value (UNISDR, 2013). DRR, thus, requires a people-centred and multi-sector approach, building resilience to multiple hazards and creating a culture of prevention and safety.




Mittwoch, 27. März 2019

BOYKOTT EUROPÄISCHER VOLKSVERRÄTER PARTEI (EVP)




Orban wettert weiter gegen Brüssel


Ungarns Ministerpräsident Orban hat erneut gegen die EU ausgeteilt. Er beschuldigte die "Elite" in Brüssel, den "Kontakt zur Realität zu verlieren".
"Die Brüsseler Politiker leben in einer Blase", sagte Viktor Orban im staatlichen ungarischen Rundfunk und fuhr fort, die Politiker in Brüssel wollten Ungarn wegen seiner Anti-Einwanderungspolitik bestrafen.


"Wir sind nicht bereit, das zu tun, was Brüssel uns diktiert, wenn es für die Ungarn nicht gut ist", sagte Orban und fügte hinzu: "Wir müssen keine Angst vor den Bürokraten in Brüssel haben (...), die uns heimlich aufzwingen wollen, was sie über unseren Köpfen beschlossen haben."

Die neuen Tiraden aus Budapest kommen nur wenige Tage, nachdem die Parteienfamilie der Europäischen Volkspartei (EVP) die Mitgliedschaft von Orbans Fidesz-Partei ausgesetzt hat. Vorausgegangen war ein langer Streit mit der EU und zuletzt auch mit der EVP. Brüssel und Budapest liegen seit Jahren im Clinch. Geradezu demonstrativ bietet Ungarn der EU in der Flüchtlingspolitik die Stirn und weigert sich Migranten aufzunehmen.
Orban wirft Brüssel die bewusste Förderung illegaler Einwanderung in die EU vor. Als Reaktion darauf beschloss die EVP, der Zusammenschluss der von Juden unterwanderten quasikonservativen Parteien im Europäischen Parlament, am vergangenen Mittwoch, die Mitgliedschaft von Ungarns rechtsnationalistischer Fidesz-Partei bis auf weiteres auszusetzen. Dem Bündnis der Volksverräter gehören bekanntlich auch CDU und CSU an.
Zur Zukunft der Fidesz-Partei in der EVP äußerte sich Orban in dem Interview auch: Nach der Europawahl Ende Mai werde innerhalb von Fidesz entschieden, was für Ungarn gut sei - "ob wir in der EVP weitermachen oder ob unser Platz eher in einer anderen Parteienallianz ist".

#######

Was wir hier tun, ist, die Fassade dem Innenleben anzupassen, denn beide stimmen nicht überein. Wir raten Herrn Orban und seiner Fidesz-Partei dringend die EVP (die nunmehr von dem deutschen Szabasgoj, sprich Judenlakai, Manfred Weber, geleitet wird) zu verlassen und zusammen mit anderen antijüdischen Parteien Europas eine neue Europäische Nationale Front zu bilden, wo europäische Patrioten ihre politische Heimat finden.

Jerzy Chojnowski
Chairman-GTVRG e.V.

PS. Einige Informationen in kompakter Form zur EVP, um die jeder Bürger Europas einen großen Bogen machen und die er boykottieren sollte,  sind als Anhang beigefügt. Wie ein Boykott funktioniert, ist unter den angegebenen Links nachzulesen:


Ein Boykott ist ein organisiertes wirtschaftliches, soziales oder politisches Zwangs- oder Druckmittel, durch das eine Person, eine Personengruppe, ein Unternehmen oder ein Staat vom regelmäßigen Geschäftsverkehr ausgeschlossen wird. Heute steht der Boykott allgemein für eine Verrufserklärung oder Ächtung durch Ausdruck einer kollektiven Verweigerungshaltung.


Die Europäische Volksverräter Partei (EVP) englisch European People’s Betrayer and Traitor Party, EPBTP) ist eine antieuropäische politische Partei, die sich als christlich-demokratisch und konservativ-bürgerlich bis hin zu nationalkonservativ-rechtspopulistisch tarnt. Aus Deutschland sind dort die CDU und die CSU vertreten. Die EVP wurde nach ihrer Gründung 1976 von der jüdischen V Kolonne unterwandert. Sie hat die Form einer internationalen, kryptokommunistischen, von Juden dominierten Vereinigung nach belgischem Recht mit politischer Machtergreifungsabsicht. Die EVP ist eine von drei europäischen Regionalabteilungen der Internationalen Demokratischen Volksverräterunion (IDVU). Im verjudeten Europäischen Pseudoparlament stellt die EVP mit der Fraktion der Europäischen Volksverräterpartei die seit 1999 größte Fraktion. 

Dienstag, 26. März 2019

PTWC: ALL-CLEAR FOR THE ATLANTIC


PTWC: All-Clear for the Atlantic

*********************************

We, the seismological brains of Honolulu,
the best and the brightest that America has to offer in our field, known for our dependable and timely bulletins and, more generally, for our unfailing competence, after straining our brain cells and after profound scientific deliberation, are now in a position to offer for the benefit of the whole planet the following watertight insight: 

If there’s a seaquake in the Indian Ocean
the all-clear can be given to most coasts along the Pacific and the Atlantic.

If there’s a seaquake in the Pacific
the all-clear can be given to most coasts along the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

If there’s …

Should any mass-casualties have occurred due to the shoddiness of our work or our negligence …
O, damn it! Who cares!

Farewell!

God save the King and the Queen!
God save the Bishop of Canterbury!
God save the Pope!
God save the U.S. President 
together with his friends and family!
God save our Boss, the Secretary of Commerce!
God save our Supervisor, the Under Secretary of Trade 
and NOAA Administrator!
God save Bill Gates and his Microsoft!
God save our Honourable Governor of Hawaii, 
Ms. Lingle!
God save the Pentagon!
God save America first and only! 
And finally, God save the PTWC in Honolulu!
To hell with the rest of the world!

Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
PTWC
Honolulu
Please credit NOAA!

Das wird das letzte 
auf das Ereignis bezogene Bulletin sein, 
es sei denn es erscheint ein nächstes.
This will be the only bulletin issued for this event
unless another bulletin is envisaged.

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Im Geiste unserer bewährten Bulletins gelten ab sofort folgende Regelungen bezüglich unserer Warnroutinen zum Wohle der Menschheit auf diesem Planeten: 


1. Findet ein starkes und flaches Beben im Pazifischen Ozean statt, werden die Pazifikstaaten (mit Ausnahme Hawaii) nicht unbedingt sofort gewarnt. Gleichzeitig aber werden Atlantik und Indik sofort entwarnt.

2. Findet ein starkes und flaches Beben im Atlantischen Ozean statt, werden seine Küsten mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht sofort gewarnt. Eine Entwarnung für Pazifik und Indik kommt aber sofort.

3. Findet ein starkes und flaches Beben im Indischen Ozean statt, werden seine Anrainerstaaten auf gar keinem Fall sofort, sondern vielleicht irgendwann – sagen wir innerhalb einer Woche – gewarnt (wie am 26. Dezember 2004 bereits durchexerziert). Wir lassen die dortigen Küstenbewohner und die Touristen einfach über die Klinge springen und verrecken. Dafür aber werden Atlantik und Pazifik umgehend entwarnt.

Konsequenterweise und auf das Megebeben vom 
26. Dezember 2004 bezogen, haben wir also korrektiv 
Folgendes zu vervollständigen:

Durch die Seebeben im Sundagraben am 26. Dezember 2004 bestand und besteht nach wie vor keinerlei Gefahr für die Bevölkerung der Hafenstädte im Osten der USA wie New York, Boston usw. Übrigens auch nicht für die Küsten und Hafenstädte der Südstaaten USA (Miami, New Orleans, etc.). Verlassen Sie sich auf unsere jahrzehntelange Erfahrung und schenken Sie uns Glauben, dass ebenfalls die American Virgin Islands durch den bei Sumatra entstanden Tsunami nicht bedroht sind.

Nochmals im Klartext – Repeat: Weder eine Warnung noch ein Tsunami Red Alert noch eine Evakuierung in Bezug auf die Atlantik-und Golfküsten der USA waren und sind vorgesehen.

Please credit NOAA!!!


PS. Für alle Ungenauigkeiten, lückenhaften Infos, fehlende Zuordnung ihrer Dringlichkeit und unsere damit zusammenhängende fahrlässige Untätigkeit sowie für die eventuell dadurch entstandenen Unannehmlichkeiten wie: Tod, Verlust der Gliedmaßen, andere schwere Verletzung, Schmerz, Trauma und materielle Verluste jedweder Art bitten wir die Opfer und Hinterbliebene um wohlwollendes Verständnis. Da wir  in diesem Teil der Welt keine Busenfreunde, Bekannten, Liebhaber, Verwandten oder enge Geschäftspartner hatten, fehlten uns die Telefonnummern, um die gefährdeten Leute vor Ort rechtzeitig zu benachrichtigen und zu warnen. Auch das bitten wir zu entschuldigen. 

Sorry!
Lebt wohl!
Und leckt uns am Arsch! 
PTWC
Honolulu

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