MASKI OPADAJĄ!

 

Irena Pieczko

Maski opadają!

Niemiecki wydawca Axel Springer, który jest właścicielem kilku izraelskich stron internetowych, powiedział w zeszłym tygodniu pracownikom, że mogą odejść, jeśli sprzeciwiają się izraelskiej fladze na siedzibie firmy – podaje we wtorek portal Times of Israel.

https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/.../8195365,axel-springer...

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Opada maska fałszu o rzekomej niezależności politycznej prasy i judaszowskiej obłudzie co do ponadpartyjności mediów i ich służbie dla dobra narodu... pozostaje naga prawda.

Jerzy Chojnowski


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Chairman-GTVRG e.V., www.gtvrg.de

KTO RZĄDZI ROSJĄ?

ŻYDOWSKA ZARAZA CZYLI KTO FAKTYCZNIE RZĄDZI ROSJĄ

''Tacy są przedstawiciele „wiecznie prześladowanych”. Spójrzmy na rozprawę sądową, wszczętą przeciwko redaktorowi naczelnemu „Sławianina” (przy obecnej „wolności słowa” takich procesów – są tysiące). W prokuraturze Wołogdy siedzą albo kompletne głupki, którzy nie rozumieją, co robią, albo typowi szabes-goje, którzy świadomie robią rzeczy, przydatne dla Syjonu. Ponieważ tego, co robią, inaczej nazwać nie można.

Redaktorowi gazety „Sławianin” B. F. Popowowi próbuje się zakazać być redaktorem tej gazety. Prokuratura próbuje go zdyskwalifikować. „Przyszywa” mu się niezdolność do wykonywania pracy. Co prawda, na początku starano się umieścić go za kratkami. Dwukrotnie przeciwko niemu była wszczynana sprawa karna. Czy wymieniać artykuł? 282-gi. Naturalnie, za „podżeganie do nienawiści etnicznej”. O jakim podżeganiu do nienawiści etnicznej jest mowa? Gazeta, którą osobiście bardzo lubię i czytam nieustannie, żadnej wrogości wobec Żydów nie wymyśla. Operuje tylko faktami. A fakty są takie: władza w Rosji należy do Żydów. A oni rządzą tak, że na każde urodzone rosyjskie dziecko przypada dziesięciu zmarłych ludzi. Myśleli, że Rosjanie będą umierać milcząc? Nie te czasy, wiecie?. Cicho i baz hałasu prokuraturze z Władimirem Fedotowiczem rozprawić się nie udało. Nie udało się prokuraturze schować redaktora – nacjonalisty za kratkami. W jego obronie stanęli rosyjscy uczeni. To akademik J.K. Biegunow i doktor prawa O.G. Korotajew. Dali kompleksową ocenę jego gazety. Oto, co mówią: „Śledztwo karne prowadzi się nielegalnie, jest tylko propaganda, a nie działanie, a propaganda według obowiązujących przepisów nie jest karalna”.

Postępowanie karne zostało umorzone z powodu braku dowodów przestępstwa. Wtedy sąd zamknął gazetę. Gazeta została bez założyciela. Znaleziono ku temu powody. Sąd miejski Wołogdy uznał, że Wołgodski Oddział Wszechprawosławnego Soboru zakończył swoją działalność. Nie ma założyciela – nie ma też gazety. Przyczepili się do tego, że gazeta w czasie procesu nie miała statutu i umowy z instytucją rejestrującą. A to było wystarczające według artykułu 15 ustawy „O środkach masowego przekazu” („Sławianin”). Ale dla sądu to było za mało. Władimira Popowa próbuje się zdyskwalifikować, uznając go za ubezwłasnowolnionego. Ponadto „przyszywa” mu się skrajny wariant niezdolności do pracy po to, aby przydzielić mu opiekuna. Z taką diagnozą on nawet kroku w bok nie może zrobić, a nie, żeby ponownie otworzyć i zacząć redagować gazetę. I to wszystko pomimo faktu, że Popow – to psychicznie normalny człowiek i nigdzie nie był rejestrowany w sądach do czasu wstrzymania wydawania gazety. Sąd 9 listopada 2001 roku anulował zaświadczenie o rejestracji gazety.

Wniosek o uznanie jego niezdolności do działania pochodzi od prokuratora. Sprawa dotycząca wniosku prokuratora – niewidki znajduje się w Sądzie Wołogdy. Sąd odmawia Popowowi rozpatrzenia skargi o oszczerstwo. Kto to wszystko zamówił u „prawników” Wołogdy? Kim są ci ludzie? Jakiej oni są narodowości? Gdzie pracują? W związku z tym haniebnym procesem powstaje kolejne pytanie: czy nie za dużo ci „prawnicy” biorą na siebie? Czy nie przekraczają swoich skromnych pełnomocnictw? Jak można z normalnego człowieka „zrobić” nienormalnego? Korzystając z łatwowierności Popowa, bez ostrzeżenia wiozą go nie wiadomo gdzie. Podobno w interesie dochodzenia. W wyniku oszustwa (w rzeczywistości jest to przemoc wobec osoby) Władimir Popow został poddany serii badań: dotyczących sprawdzania pamięci oraz ponownej sadowo – psychiatrycznej ekspertyzy pod nieobecność adwokata. Jakim prawem? Kim są ci urzędnicy na stanowiskach, którzy zorganizowali to wszystko i przekroczyli swoje uprawnienia? Jakie są ich nazwiska? Jakie są ich stanowiska? To wszystko nie jest ujawniane.

A Władimir Popow – to bardzo szanowany człowiek. Weteran II Wojny Światowej, który zdobywał Berlin, emerytowany pułkownik, absolwent Akademii Broni Pancernej, przewodniczący Soboru Wszechprawosławnego. Popow już po raz 8-my został wybrany na to stanowisko przez walne zgromadzenie. Mówi to o nim, że jest to psychicznie zupełnie normalny i zdrowy człowiek. Gdyby był wariatem, to nigdy nie mógłby redagować i drukować tak wspaniałej gazety!

Na jakiej podstawie Popow jest śledzony? Jakim prawem? Kto wydał rozkaz śledzenia Popowa? Kim są te osoby na stanowiskach, które to wszystko zorganizowały i przekroczyły swoje uprawnienia? Jakie są ich nazwiska? Jakie są ich kompetencje i stanowiska? W ślad za Popowem porusza się samochód z napisem „Eskorta”. Fakt ten znajduje odzwierciedlenie w oświadczeniu weteranów wojny, tyłów, pracy, oficerów, fizyków – atomistów i innych w obronie Popowa. Oświadczenie to przekazano do Sądu Wołogdy. Nacjonaliści żądają ujawnienia nazwisk tych, którzy prześladują Popowa, ale kto im je poda? Wszyscy tłumacza się „dobrem (interesami) śledztwa”. Jest oczywiste, jakie są to interesy!

Informacji na temat procesu jest bardzo mało. Nie wiem, czym on się zakończył i kiedy się zaczął. Takie fakty nie są ujawniane, w telewizji ich się nie pokazuje, w mediach nie drukuje, a przebieg sprawy znany jest niewielu. Robi się to po to, aby się po cichu rozprawiać z niewygodnymi dla reżymu, na poziomie małych dźwigni władzy. Mam kilkadziesiąt takich haniebnych procesów, zaczerpniętych z narodowych publikacji i gazet. Można z pewnością powiedzieć jedno: redaktorzy gazet narodowych byli wzywani do prokuratur wojewódzkich, a wielu z nich po kilka razy.

Tymczasem w telewizji występuje przewodniczący Związku Gmin Wyznaniowych Żydowskich, rabin synagogi w Moskwie i członek „B’nai B’rith” Szajewicz Adolf Solomonowicz. Władimir Putin spotyka się na Kremlu z przedstawicielami Federacji Gmin Żydowskich Rosji (FGŻR), na czele z głównym rabinem Berlem Lazarem. Nam, „drogim Rosjanom” proponuje się podzielać radość tych Żydów z powodu, że prezydent interesuje się ich życiem religijnym w „wyjątkowym państwie wielonarodowym”. Tematów, które były tam dyskutowane, nie znamy. Ale wiadomo dokładnie, że wypłynęła bajka, od której dostali oskomy wszyscy nacjonaliści, o nieszczęśliwych i upokorzonych Żydach i o jakiejś „ksenofobii i ekstremizmie religijnym.” W jaki sposób wy, „wybrani przez Boga”, już to dostaliście? Chcecie, aby was szanowano i kochano?

Nie doczekacie się!'' ŹRÓDŁO: FB, Nikodem Kot

JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011 LESSONS LEARNED

VIDEO: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tōhoku-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami

https://twitter.com/IRIS_EPO/status/1403502398002376706?s=20

POLIZEIRAZZIA BEI DER POLIZEI

 Skandal im Polizeipräsidium

Polizei Frankfurt: Neue Ermittlungen wegen rechtsextremer Chats gegen 20 Beamte

Von Jan Lucas Frenger

Aktualisiert: 09.06.21 - 13:55

Das Polizeipräsidium an der Adickesallee in Frankfurt am Main – auch dort führte das LKA eine Durchsuchung durch.

© Boris Roessler/dpa

Das LKA Hessen ermittelt gegen SEK-Beamte des Polizeipräsidiums Frankfurt. Der Vorwurf: Volksverhetzung und weitere Straftaten.

+++ 13.30 Uhr: Das LKA ermittelt im neuen Skandal-Fall der Frankfurter Polizei gegen 20 Beamte. Die Polizisten sollen in einem privaten Chat rechtsextremistische Nachrichten ausgetauscht haben. Und das ist längst nicht der erste Skandal des Präsidiums in Frankfurt.

Erst im März dieses Jahres nahm die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt die Ermittlungen gegen einen 41-jährigen Polizisten aus dem Präsidium in Frankfurt auf, weil dieser im Verdacht stand, Schusswaffen im großen Stil aus der Asservatenkammer entwendet und verkauft* zu haben. Und dabei war der Beschuldigte kein Unbekannter: Bereits im September 2020 sorgte der Mann für Schlagzeilen, als ihm eine Verbindung zur rechtsextremen Sicherheitsfirma „Asgaard“* nachgewiesen wurde. Doch damit nicht genug: Gegen den Beamten wurde bereits seit Juli letzten Jahres ermittelt – er habe unerlaubterweise auf Informationen der Polizei-Datenbanken für seine Nebentätigkeit bei „Asgaard“ zugegriffen. Insgesamt soll es in dem Fall laut der FAZ um eine dreistellige Anzahl von Pistolen, Revolvern, Langwaffen und Munitionsteilen gehen, deren Verbleib auch nach wie vor völlig unklar ist.

Polizeipräsidium Frankfurt: Beamte sorgen für zahlreiche Skandale

Anfang April 2021 soll ein Beamter der Polizei Frankfurt einen Passanten beleidigt und brutal angegangen haben. Darüber hinaus habe er den Mann laut dessen Aussagen nach seinem „Juden-Ausweis“ gefragt*. Zuletzt schaltete sich aufgrund der Vorwürfe die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt in dem Fall ein – es sollten Zeugen zum Hergang der vermeintlichen Tat befragt werden.

In den vergangenen Jahren sah sich die Polizei in Hessen immer wieder mit zahlreichen Vorwürfen konfrontiert. Die Bandbreite der Skandale reichte dabei von Drohschreiben an mehrere Personen mit dem Zusatz „NSU 2.0“ (die Daten der betroffenen Personen wurden auf einem Computer der Polizei Frankfurt abgerufen), bis hin zu Notrufen, die in der Nacht des rassistischen Attentats in Hanau nicht durchgestellt werden konnten. Auch mit rechtsextremen Gruppenchats hatte es die Polizei Frankfurt nicht das erste Mal zu tun – im Rahmen der Ermittlungen im „NSU 2.0“-Fall fanden die Ermittler auf dem Telefon einer Polizistin ebenfalls Chats mit antisemitischen und rechtsextremen Inhalten*.

Erstmeldung vom Mittwoch, 09.06.2021, 12.29 Uhr: Dieser Fall erschüttert ganz Hessen. Seit April 2021 führen die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt* und das hessische Landeskriminalamt (LKA) Ermittlungen gegen mehrere Polizisten des Polizeipräsidiums in Frankfurt. Der Vorwurf: Die Verwendung von Kennzeichen verfassungswidriger Organisationen sowie weitere Straftaten. Am Mittwochmorgen (09.06.2021) wurden laut Mitteilung des LKA nun sechs Durchsuchungsbeschlüsse des Amtsgerichts Frankfurt am Main in dem Fall vollstreckt.

Die Ermittlungen beruhen ursprünglich auf einem Fall, bei dem einem 38-jährigen Beamten des SEK in Frankfurt, mit Wohnsitz in Rheinland-Pfalz, im Rahmen eines Ermittlungsverfahrens der Staatsanwaltschaft Mainz unter anderem der Besitz und die Verbreitung kinderpornografischer Inhalte vorgeworfen wird. Als die Ermittler die Mobiltelefone des Beschuldigten kontrollierten, stießen sie laut offizieller Mitteilung des LKA jedoch auf mehrere Chatgruppen mit weiteren SEK-Beamten aus dem Präsidium in Frankfurt. Aus diesem Grund wurden die weiteren Ermittlungen seit Mitte April 2021 an die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt übergeben.

SEK-Beamte aus Frankfurter Präsidium: 17 Beschuldigte – volksverhetzende Inhalte geteilt

In den Gruppen schickten sich die Polizisten nach Angaben des LKA unter anderem Nachrichten mit volksverhetzenden Inhalten sowie Abbildungen einer ehemaligen nationalsozialistischen Organisation. Das hessische Landeskriminalamt hat am 21. April 2021 im Auftrag der Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt die Ermittlungen aufgenommen und im weiteren Verlauf eine Arbeitsgruppe eingerichtet. In den vergangenen Wochen führte diese Arbeitsgruppe bereits Ermittlungen zur umgehenden Aufklärung der Vorwürfe durch.

Betroffen von den Ermittlungen des LKA sind demnach 20 männliche Personen, darunter 19 aktive Polizeibeamte und ein ehemaliger Polizist, im Alter von 29 bis 54 Jahren. 17 Beschuldigte werden laut LKA verdächtig, als Teilnehmer verschiedener Chatgruppen Beiträge mit volksverhetzenden Inhalten versendet zu haben. Die besagten Beiträge stammen demnach vorwiegend aus den Jahren 2016/2017. Die letzten relevanten Inhalte wurden Anfang 2019 festgestellt. Gegen drei der 20 Beschuldigten wurden Informationen des LKA zufolge bereits Ermittlungen aufgrund des Verdachts der Strafvereitelung im Amt aufgenommen, da sie als Teilnehmer der relevanten Chatgruppen die Inhalte nicht gemeldet hatten.

LKA in Ermittlungen gegen Beamte des Präsidiums Frankfurt: Durchsuchung von sechs Wohnungen

Bei den am Mittwoch durchsuchten Objekten handelt es sich laut LKA um die Wohnungen von sechs beteiligten Polizisten sowie das Präsidium in Frankfurt. Die Durchsuchungen werden demnach in verschiedenen Ortschaften in Hessen durchgeführt. Alle 19 beschuldigten aktiven Beamten des Polizeipräsidiums Frankfurt wurden vorerst vom Dienst freigestellt. Der Mitteilung nach wird einer der Polizisten darüber hinaus sogar suspendiert. (Jan Lucas Frenger) *fr.de ist ein Angebot von IPPEN.MEDIA.

https://www.fr.de/frankfurt/skandal-polizeipraesidium-frankfurt-sek-beamte-volksverhetzende-inhalte-chat-ermittlungsverfahren-lka-durchsuchungen-zr-90795228.amp.html

FORECAST MEGATHRUST EARTHQUAKES

 

A better way to forecast megathrust earthquakes and subsequent tsunami events

POSTED ON JUNE 7, 2021 BY TEMBLOR

Megathrust earthquakes have caused some of the most devastating natural disasters in history, but a new model could improve our ability to forecast them.
 

By Jessica Orwig, Ph.D., Science Writer
 

Citation: Orwig, J., 2021, A better way to forecast megathrust earthquakes and subsequent tsunami events, Temblor, http://doi.org/10.32858/temblor.180
 

The costliest natural disaster in history happened in 2011 when a megathrust earthquake struck off the coast of Japan, triggering the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. The events resulted in nearly 20,000 deaths and cost an estimated $220 billion USD in damages.
 

Sendai airport, in Japan, after the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. Credit: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) (Japan), CC BY 3.0 IGO via Wikimedia Commons

 

Megathrust earthquakes are some of the most destructive forces of nature on the planet because they occur underwater. When such massive faults move, they displace water, generating powerful tsunamis that can devastate entire cities. In the case of the Tohoku earthquake, the tsunami inundated areas up to 130 feet (40 meters) above sea level.

The fact that megathrust earthquakes happen miles offshore also makes them difficult to monitor. This means that, in the past, researchers have had to make assumptions in their forecasting models that may have led to misleading results, according to new research published in Nature Geoscience. In this latest work, a different model suggests that the risk from megathrust earthquakes is higher than previously thought.
 

How to forecast a megathrust earthquake

Megathrust earthquakes are extremely powerful seismic events triggered in subduction zones, where one tectonic plate plunges below another. When plates collide like this, it produces a slow shift in the ground — usually a few centimeters per year.

Normally, researchers can monitor impending earthquakes by using GPS instruments to track these subtle movements. How quickly the ground moves is an indication of how fast the plates are slipping.
 

An example of a GPS monitoring system in the Aleutian Islands. Credit: UNAVCO

 

Researchers then compare this slip rate to the long-term motion of the two plates, giving an indication of the slip deficit accruing on the fault. A large slip deficit indicates significant stress accumulating within the surrounding plates, and therefore a more unstable fault that’s at higher risk of an earthquake.

But because megathrust earthquakes happen offshore where you can’t just install GPS sensors, monitoring the seafloor is more difficult and expensive. In most parts of the world, the seafloor-monitoring systems researchers need either do not exist or are too sparse to monitor the whole fault zone effectively. As a result of insufficient seafloor-monitoring systems, researchers have relied on alternative methods like taking seafloor samples to study the type of rocks along these subduction zones to determine their physical properties, which can shed light on slip rate and earthquake behavior.

Laboratory studies of seafloor samples from places like Japan, Ecuador, and the Cascadia Subduction Zone indicate that the faults are stable and slipping freely — meaning the faults are building minimal stress. This has led past models to assume a slip deficit of zero, suggesting a low risk of megathrust earthquakes in these areas, says Eric Lindsey of the University of New Mexico and lead author of the new study.

“The thing is that all of these models, they sometimes apply different boundary conditions and different constraints,” says Daniel Melnick of the Austral University of Chile who wasn’t involved in the new research. For example, some models are for areas that are not completely covered by land-based GPS stations and as a result, researchers assume a slip deficit of zero. “That’s a constraint that’s not necessarily true. The interpretation of the slip deficit map is not always straightforward [in past models],” Melnick says.
 

It takes two

In the new study, Lindsey, who led this research while at the Earth Observatory of Singapore, and his colleagues introduce a novel way of estimating slip deficit along subduction zones.

Typically, faults are described as lines on a map. But in three dimensions, the surface of these megathrusts extends hundreds of kilometers into the earth, often below land that sits above sea level. Lindsey’s team correlated data from two different parts of a megathrust fault: the shallower, underwater part — where megathrust-tsunami events occur — and the deeper part that is located under land. They tested the model according to data from the Japan Trench and the Cascadia Subduction Zone, and concluded that the slip deficit is higher than previously thought.

When the land-based deeper part of the fault is locked, or not moving — which scientists know because of land-based GPS instruments that measure movement — that part of the fault generates what Lindsey and the team call a “stress shadow” along the shallow part of the fault. Depending on factors like how long the deeper fault section has been locked, their model uses this stress shadow to calculate the slip deficit along the shallower, underwater part of the fault.
 

When the deeper part of a subduction fault is locked, it generates a stress shadow along the shallow part of the fault that can be used to predict earthquake risk. Credit: Eric Lindsey

 

“That is why the Lindsey paper is so important — because [Lindsey and colleagues] provide a clear method of a theoretical concept of how to frame the slip deficit map of the shallow megathrust,” Melnick says. “I think it’s very important.”
 

Limitations

Lindsey says that a limit of the model is in areas where “the deeper fault is not locked or only partly locked, which means there is less of a stress shadow cast on the shallow part. In those areas, our model is not as effective in allowing us to resolve the shallow slip deficit.”

One area where this is the case is in the Cascadia Subduction Zone in southern Oregon, Lindsey says. “There is not as much deep locking on the fault, and consequently our model uncertainty is higher near the trench, in the shallow part of the fault.”
 

Off the coast of Oregon, pictured above, the Cascadia Subduction Zone consumes the Juan de Fuca oceanic plate. In the past, earthquakes in this region have caused devastating tsunamis, like the 1700 Cascadia earthquake and tsunami. Credit: pfly, CC BY-SA 2.0 via Flickr

 

Where the team’s model can really make a difference is in places that generate the largest megathrust earthquakes like Tohoku, Lindsey says. That’s because these events “require deep locking, which means those areas will almost always have a high slip deficit near the trench.”
 

Why it matters

Accurate slip deficit estimates are important because “that slip deficit can be directly used to calculate the maximum magnitude of a forthcoming earthquake,” says Melnick.

“Say you have a slip deficit of one meter over an area of 100 square kilometers,” says Melnick, who is part of a team that’s measuring earthquake potential off the coast of South America. “That could be equivalent to a magnitude-7 earthquake because the seismic moment is equal to the area of the fault times the slip.”

Lindsey says that, in a perfect world, there would be a vast network of seafloor instruments that could easily monitor these shallow faults more directly. But in the meantime, he says most models in which researchers have assumed a slip deficit value of zero “should be reevaluated because those models might have been made with a faulty assumption.”
 

References

Lindsey, E.O., Mallick, R., Hubbard, J.A. et al. Slip rate deficit and earthquake potential on shallow megathrusts. Nat. Geosci. 14, 321–326 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-021-00736-x

A better way to forecast megathrust earthquakes and subsequent tsunami events - Temblor.net

ÜBER DIE BEISTANDSVERPFLICHTUNG

Responsibility to protect

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit in order to address its four key concerns to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.^[1][2]

The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations.^[3][4][5] The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.^[6][7] The R2P has three pillars:

1. Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state – "Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity"
2. Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building – States pledge to assist each other in their protection responsibilities
3. Pillar III: Timely and decisive collective response – If any state is "manifestly failing" in its protection responsibilities, then states should take collective action to protect the population.^[8][9]

While there is agreement among states about the Responsibility to Protect, there is persistent contestation about the applicability of the third pillar in practice.^[8] The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort.^[10] The United Nations Secretary-General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity crimes.^{[11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21]}

The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for example.^{[22][23][24][25][26][27]}

Contents

• 1Definition
  • 1.1Scope and limitations of the Responsibility to Protect
  • 1.2Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
  • 1.3The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention'
• 2History of the Responsibility to Protect
  • 2.11990s: Origins
  • 2.22000: African Union proposes a right to intervene
  • 2.32000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
  • 2.42005 World Summit Outcome Document
  • 2.5Secretary-General's 2009 report
  • 2.6Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
• 3United Nations
  • 3.1Security Council
  • 3.2Secretary-General reports
  • 3.3Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect
• 4In practice
  • 4.1Kenya 2007/2008
  • 4.2Ivory Coast 2011
  • 4.3Libya 2011
  • 4.4Central African Republic (CAR) 2013
    • 4.4.1CAR and the R2P
  • 4.5Syria
  • 4.6Burundi
  • 4.7Yemen Crisis
• 5Praise for R2P
• 6Criticism of R2P
  • 6.1National sovereignty
  • 6.2Libya, 2011
  • 6.3Syria, 2011: Russian and Chinese repudiation of abuse of R2P
  • 6.4Military intervention
  • 6.5Structural Problems
• 7See also
• 8Further reading
• 9References
  • 9.1Sources
• 10External links

Definition[edit]

The Responsibility to Protect is a political commitment unanimously adopted by all members of the United Nations General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit and articulated in paragraphs 138–139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

140. We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.

The above paragraphs in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document serve as the basis for the inter-governmental agreement to the Responsibility to Protect. The General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document in its resolution 60/1 of 2005.^[28] The body subsequently committed to continue consideration of the Responsibility to Protect with its Resolution A/Res/63/308 of October 2009.^[29] The UN Security Council first reaffirmed the Responsibility to Protect in Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, recalling in particular paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.^[30]

Scope and limitations of the Responsibility to Protect[edit]

The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which first articulated the Responsibility to Protect in its December 2001 Report, envisioned a wide scope of application in its articulation of the principle. This included "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened."^[5]

Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit refined the scope of the Responsibility to Protect to the four crimes mentioned in paragraphs 138 and 139, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which are commonly referred to as 'atrocity crimes' or 'mass atrocity crimes'.^[10]

As per the Secretary-General's 2009 Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, "The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity...To try to extend it to cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility."^[9]

The focused scope is part of what the UN Secretary-General has termed a "narrow but deep approach" to the Responsibility to Protect: A narrow application to four crimes, but a deep approach to response, employing the wide array of prevention and protection instruments available to Member States, the United Nations system, regional and subregional organizations and civil society.^[9]

Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect[edit]

The Responsibility to Protect consists of three important and mutually-reinforcing pillars, as articulated in the 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on the issue, and which build off paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and the intergovernmental agreement to the principle:

1. Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state – "Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity"
2. Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building – States pledge to assist each other in their protection responsibilities
3. Pillar III: Timely and decisive collective response – If any state is "manifestly failing" in its protection responsibilities, then states should take collective action to protect the population.^[8][9]

While there is widespread agreement among states about the Responsibility to Protect (only Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Sudan have questioned R2P's validity), there is persistent contestation about the applicability of the third pillar in practice.^[8]

According to the UN Secretary-General's 2012 report, the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect are not sequential and are of equal importance. "Without all three, the concept would be incomplete. All three pillars must be implemented in a manner fully consistent with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter."^[15] The pillared approach is intended to reinforce, not undermine state sovereignty. As per the 2009 report of the Secretary-General, "By helping States to meet their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it. It seeks to help States to succeed, not just to react when they fail."^[9]

The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention'[edit]

The Responsibility to Protect differs from humanitarian intervention in four important ways. First, humanitarian intervention only refers to the use of military force, whereas R2P is first and foremost a preventive principle that emphasizes a range of measures to stem the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity before the crimes are threatened or occur. The use of force may only be carried out as a measure of last resort, when all other non-coercive measures have failed, and only when it is authorized by the UN Security Council.^[31] This is in contrast to the principle of 'humanitarian intervention', which dubiously claims to allow for the use of force as a humanitarian imperative without the authorization of the Security Council.

The second point relates to the first. As a principle, the Responsibility to Protect is rooted firmly in existing international law, especially the law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.^[32]

Third, while humanitarian interventions have in the past been justified in the context of varying situations, R2P focuses only on the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The first three crimes are clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the treaty which established the International Criminal Court. Ethnic cleansing is not a crime defined under international law, but has been defined by the UN as "a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas".^[33]

Finally, while humanitarian intervention assumes a "right to intervene", the R2P is based on a "responsibility to protect".^[31] Humanitarian intervention and the R2P both agree on the fact that sovereignty is not absolute. However, the R2P doctrine shifts away from state-centered motivations to the interests of victims by focusing not on the right of states to intervene but on a responsibility to protect populations at risk.^[34] In addition, it introduces a new way of looking at the essence of sovereignty, moving away from issues of "control" and emphasising "responsibility" to one's own citizens and the wider international community.^[35]

History of the Responsibility to Protect[edit]

1990s: Origins[edit]

The norm of the R2P was born out of the international community's failure to respond to tragedies such as the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica genocide in 1995. Kofi Annan, who was Assistant Secretary-General at the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide,^[36] realized the international community's failure to respond. In the wake of the Kosovo intervention, 1999, Annan insisted that traditional notions of sovereignty had been redefined: "States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples",^[37] he said, while U.S. President Bill Clinton cited human rights concerns in 46% of the hundreds of remarks that he made justifying intervention in Kosovo.^[38] In 2000, and in his capacity as UN Secretary-General, Annan wrote the report "We the Peoples" on the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, and in this report he posed the following question: "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"^[39]

2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene[edit]

Many critics of the R2P's third pillar claim that R2P is a Western concept, but it was the African Union (AU) that pioneered the concept that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in crisis situations if a state is failing to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes.^[40] In 2000, the AU incorporated the right to intervene in a member state, as enshrined in Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act, which declares "[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".^[41] The AU also adopted the Ezulwini Consensus in 2005, which welcomed R2P as a tool for the prevention of mass atrocities.^[42]

2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty[edit]

In September 2000, following an appeal by its Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to answer Annan's question "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?" In February 2001, at the third round table meeting of the ICISS in London, Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, and Michael Ignatieff suggested the phrase "responsibility to protect" as a way to avoid the "right to intervene" or "obligation to intervene" doctrines and yet keep a degree of duty to act to resolve humanitarian crises.^[43]

In 2001, ICISS released a report titled "The Responsibility to Protect". In a radical reformulation of the meaning of state sovereignty, the report argued that sovereignty entailed not only rights but also responsibilities, specifically a state's responsibility to protect its people from major violations of human rights. This idea rested on earlier work by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen regarding internally displaced persons.^[44] Inspiration may also be attributed to Jan Eliasson, who in response to a questionnaire on internally displaced persons distributed by Francis Deng, stated that assisting populations at risk within their own country was "basically a question of striking a balance between sovereignty and solidarity with people in need."^[45] The ICISS report further asserted that, where a state was "unable or unwilling" to protect its people, the responsibility should shift to the international community and "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." The ICISS argued that any form of military intervention is "an exceptional and extraordinary measure", and, as such, to be justified it must meet certain criteria, including:^[46]

• Just cause: There must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur".
• Right intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering.
• Last resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation.)
• Proportional means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the defined human protection objective".
• Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.
• Right authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security Council.

2005 World Summit Outcome Document[edit]

As the ICISS report was released in 2001, right around the time of the Second Gulf War, many thought that would be the end of this new norm. However, at the 2005 World Summit, where the largest number of heads of state and government in the history of the UN convened, the R2P was unanimously adopted.^[47] While the outcome was close to the ideas of the ICISS report, there were some notable differences: the R2P would now only apply to mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing), rather than human rights violations; no mention was made of the criteria of intervention (see above); and the UN Security Council was made the only body allowed to authorize intervention. The paragraphs also stress the importance of regional organizations and the role they can play through Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

The results of this summit led to world leaders agreeing on holding each other accountable if they fail to uphold the new responsibilities. Decidedly if one state fails to uphold their responsibility this is now where State Sovereignty may be broken in order to protect people in danger of such crimes. First peaceful action is to be taken through humanitarian, diplomatic, or other means. If these fail to resolve the matter, the international community should come together in a “timely and decisive manner”. This shall all be worked on a case-by-case basis through the UN Security Council as well as the UN Charter.^[48]

Secretary-General's 2009 report[edit]

On 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. The report was the first comprehensive document from the UN Secretariat on the R2P, following Ban's stated commitment to turn the concept into policy. The Secretary-General's report set the tone and the direction for the discussion on the subject at the UN. The report proposes three-pillar approach to the R2P:

• Pillar One stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
• Pillar Two addresses the international community's commitment to help states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help those under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
• Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to act in a timely and decisive way to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when a state manifestly fails to protect its populations.

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect[edit]

The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) is an international non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy for the Responsibility to protect. The Centre is based at the Graduate Center, CUNY, New York City with an office also located in Geneva.^[49]

United Nations[edit]

At the 2005 World Summit, UN member states included R2P in the Outcome Document agreeing to Paragraphs 138 and 139 as written in its Definition. These paragraphs gave final language to the scope of R2P. It applies to the four mass atrocities crimes only. It also identifies to whom the R2P protocol applies; i.e., nations first, and regional and international communities second. Since then, the UN has been actively engaged with the development of the R2P. Several resolutions, reports, and debates have emerged through the UN forum.

Security Council[edit]

The Security Council has reaffirmed its commitment to the R2P in more than 80 resolutions.^[50] The first such resolution came in April 2006, when the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in Resolution 1674, formalizing their support for the R2P. In 2009, the Council again recognized states' primary responsibility to protect and reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 in resolution 1894.

Additionally, the Security Council has mentioned the R2P in several country-specific resolutions:

• Darfur: Resolution 1706 in 2006
• Libya: Resolution 1970, Resolution 1973 in 2011, Resolution 2016 in 2011, and Resolution 2040 in 2012
• Côte d'Ivoire: Resolution 1975 in 2011
• Yemen: Resolution 2014 in 2011
• Mali: Resolution 2085 in 2012 and Resolution 2100 in 2013
• Sudan and South Sudan: Resolution 1996 in 2011 and Resolution 2121 in 2013

Secretary-General reports[edit]

In January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released UN Secretariat's first comprehensive report on the R2P, called Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.^[51] His report led to a debate in the General Assembly in July 2009 and the first time since 2005 that the General Assembly had come together to discuss the R2P. Ninety-four member states spoke. Most supported the R2P principle, although some important concerns were voiced. They discussed how to implement the R2P in crisis situations around the world. The debate highlighted the need for regional organizations like the African Union to play a strong role in implementing R2P; the need for stronger early warning mechanisms in the UN; and the need to clarify the roles UN bodies would play in implementing R2P.^[52][53]

One outcome of the debate was the first resolution referencing R2P adopted by the General Assembly. The Resolution (A/RES/63/308) showed that the international community had not forgotten about the concept of the R2P and it decided "to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect".^[54]

In subsequent years, the Secretary-General would release a new report, followed by another debate in the General Assembly.

In 2010, the report was titled Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect. The informal interactive dialogue was held on 9 August 2010, with 49 member states, two regional organizations, and two civil society organizations speaking at the event. The discussion had a resoundingly positive tone, with virtually all of those that spoke stressing a need to prevent atrocities and agreeing that effective early warning is a necessary condition for effective prevention and early action. Objections were expressed by a small number of member states; namely Nicaragua, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and Venezuela.^[55][56]

In 2011, the report analyzed The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. At the debate on 12 July 2011, statements were made by 43 member states, three regional organizations, and four civil society representatives. The biggest challenge to R2P was considered cooperation with, and support between, the UN and regional bodies in times of crisis. Member states acknowledged the importance of resolving this challenge through the unique advantages regional organizations possess in preventing and reacting to mass atrocities.^[57][58]

In 2012, the focus was on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response. The debate followed on 5 September 2012 saw interventions address the third pillar of the R2P and the diversity of non-coercive and coercive measures available for a collective response to mass atrocity crimes.^[59]

In 2013, the Secretary-General focused on Responsibility to Protect: State responsibility and prevention. The debate following the report was held on 11 September 2013. A panel of UN, member state, and civil society experts delivered presentations, after which 68 member states, 1 regional organization, and 2 civil society organizations made statements.^[60][61]

Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect[edit]

In 2004, following the genocidal violence in Rwanda and the Balkans, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Juan E. Méndez as Special Adviser to fill critical gaps in the international system that allowed those tragedies to go unchecked. In 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Francis M. Deng on a full-time basis at the level of Under-Secretary-General. Around the same time, he also appointed Edward Luck as the Special Adviser who focuses on the R2P, on a part-time basis at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.^[62]

The Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect leads the conceptual, political, institutional, and operational development of the R2P. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide acts as a catalyst to raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to advocate and mobilize for appropriate action. The mandates of the two Special Advisers are distinct but complementary. The efforts of their Office include alerting relevant actors to the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; enhancing the capacity of the UN to prevent these crimes, including their incitement; and working with member states, regional and sub-regional arrangements, and civil society to develop more effective means of response when they do occur.^[62]

Both Special Advisers Deng and Luck ended their assignments with the Office in July 2012. On 17 July 2012, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Adama Dieng of Senegal as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.^[62] On 12 July 2013, Jennifer Welsh of Canada was appointed as the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect.^[63]

In practice[edit]

Kenya 2007/2008[edit]

From December 2007 to January 2008, Kenya was swept by a wave of ethnic violence triggered by a disputed presidential election held on 27 December 2007. On 30 December 2007, Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential elections and was sworn in as president a couple of hours later. The announcement of the results triggered widespread and systematic violence resulting in more than 1,000 deaths and the displacement of over 500,000 civilians. Clashes were characterized by the ethnically targeted killings of people aligned with the two major political parties, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU).^[64]

External intervention was almost immediate. French Foreign and European Affairs Minister Bernard Kouchner made an appeal to the UN Security Council in January 2008 to react "in the name of the responsibility to protect" before Kenya plunged into a deadly ethnic conflict. On 31 December 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement expressing concern for the ongoing violence and calling for the population to remain calm and for Kenyan security forces to show restraint. On 10 January 2008, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was accepted by both the ODM and the PNU as the African Union Chief Mediator. Mediation efforts led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement on 28 February 2008. The agreement established Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, as well as the creation of three commissions: the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV); the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission; and the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections. This rapid and coordinated reaction by the international community was praised by Human Rights Watch as "a model of diplomatic action under the 'Responsibility to Protect' principles".^[65]

Ivory Coast 2011[edit]

On 30 March 2011, in response to the escalating post-election violence against the population of Ivory Coast in late 2010 and early 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1975 condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex-President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. The resolution cited "the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians", called for the immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffirmed that the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) could use "all necessary means to protect life and property." On 4 April 2011, in an effort to protect the people of Ivory Coast from further atrocities, UNOCI began a military operation,^[66] and President Gbagbo's hold on power ended on 11 April when he was arrested by President Ouattara's forces. In November 2011, President Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court to face charges of crimes against humanity as an "indirect co-perpetrator" of murder, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts.^[67] On 26 July 2012, the Council adopted resolution 2062 renewing the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2013. The mission officially ended on 30 June 2017.^[68]

Libya 2011[edit]

President Barack Obama speaking on the military intervention in Libya at the National Defense University.

Libya was the first case where the Security Council authorized a military intervention citing the R2P. Following widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the Libyan regime, and language used by Muammar Gaddafi that reminded the international community of the genocide in Rwanda ("Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel & Marcos Tourinho (2016) The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection, Global Society, 30:1, 113-133, DOI". doi.org. doi:10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029. S2CID 145338773.), the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, making explicit reference to the R2P. Deploring what it called "the gross and systematic violation of human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence, "recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population", and imposed a series of international sanctions. The Council also decided to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court.

In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011, the Security Council demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to ongoing attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute "crimes against humanity". The Council authorized member states to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. A few days later, acting on the resolution, NATO planes started striking at Gaddafi's forces.^[69] NATO subsequently came under scrutiny for its behavior during the air strikes; concerns included the fact that the intervention quickly moved to regime-change and that there were allegations regarding aerial bombardments that may have caused civilian casualties.^[70]

Central African Republic (CAR) 2013[edit]

In December 2012, a loose rebel coalition named the Séléka initiated a military campaign to overthrow the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) and its then-president, Francois Bozizé. The Séléka, composed mostly of factions of armed groups in the northeast of the state, accused Bozizé's government of neglecting their region. They rapidly captured several strategic towns and were poised to take the capital city of Bangui. A hasty intervention by Chad and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) persuaded the Séléka to negotiate with Bozizé's government. The result, the Libreville Agreement of January 2013, installed a three-year power-sharing arrangement.^[71]

However, ECCAS failed to monitor the implementation of the Libreville Agreement and Bozizé did not undertake any of the reforms necessary under the transition agreement. Séléka resurged and took control of Bangui and fifteen of CAR's sixteen provinces on 24 March 2013. Séléka's leader, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself President, set up the National Transitional Council (NTC), and suspended CAR's constitution. A hurried ECCAS summit on 4 April 2013, which did not yet recognize Djotodia as President, called for the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC), which would create a new constitution, conduct elections in eighteen months, and select an interim President. On 13 April, the TNC chose the sole candidate vying for interim president position, Michel Djotodia.^[71]

From December 2012 onward, Séléka forces, who are predominantly Muslim, committed grave human rights abuses against civilians throughout the country and especially targeted the majority Christian population.^{[citation needed]} In response, Christian civilians formed "anti-balaka" ("anti-machete") militias, which have conducted vicious reprisals against Muslims. Extrajudicial killings of Muslim and Christian civilians have been carried out, including "door to door" searches by rival militias and mobs seeking potential victims.^[72]

The situation in CAR rapidly deteriorated after 5 December 2013, after an attack in Bangui by anti-balaka militias and loyalists of ousted President François Bozizé. The attack against former Séléka rebels sparked widespread violence throughout the capital as well as in Ouham province in the northwest. The violence marked a significant escalation of the conflict in CAR. Anti-balaka forces launched another attack against Muslim neighborhoods of Bangui on 20 December, spurring a cycle of renewed violence that led to at least 71 deaths by 24 December. A mass grave of at least 30 people who were reportedly executed and exhibited signs of torture was discovered on 25 December. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates a further 40 civilians were killed on 25 December as violence continued between anti-balaka and ex-Séléka forces. Eight African Union (AU) peacekeepers were also killed between 25 and 26 December.^[73]

According to OCHA, by September 2013 there were almost 400,000 internally displaced people and about 65,000 new refugees in neighbouring countries. Humanitarian agencies have alerted public opinion to the critical situation, stressing that 2.3 million CAR citizens (half the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance.^[74]

CAR and the R2P[edit]

The crisis in the CAR is a case for the R2P, due to mass atrocity crimes being committed by both sides.^[75] During a Security Council briefing on 25 November, UN Deputy-Secretary-General Jan Eliasson said that the world faced "a profoundly important test of international solidarity and of our responsibility to protect" in CAR. The Security Council passed Resolution 2127 on 5 December, emphasizing that the NTC has the primary responsibility to protect the civilian population in CAR. The resolution granted a Chapter VII mandate to AU and French forces to protect civilians and restore security, imposed an arms embargo, and established a UN Commission of Inquiry.^[73]

In the beginning, the international response to the coup was purely diplomatic: members of the International Contact Group insisted that Michel Djotodia respect the principles set out in the Libreville agreement. The African Union was the first to react when it announced a new African-led International Support Mission for CAR (MISCA) in July 2013. However, MISCA has not been effective in reversing the deteriorating security situation. Although its mandate is well-defined, there is general agreement that it does not have the resources to fulfill its mission. The UN General Assembly put CAR on the international agenda in September. Resolution 2121, adopted on 10 October 2013 and sponsored by France, strengthened and broadened the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). Aware that MISCA alone is unable to adequately tackle the growing insecurity, France has changed its initial position from disengagement to military contribution, as announced by François Hollande on 20 November 2013, who said that French forces would be reinforced by almost 1,000 troops for a six-month period.^[74] France began to deploy troops in CAR after receiving authorization from the Security Council on 5 December 2013 with Resolution 2127, which authorizes MISCA and French forces to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians and restore security in CAR. French soldiers immediately began to patrol in Bangui.^[73]

On 7 February 2014, it was reported that the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said that she had "opened a preliminary investigation into possible war crimes in the Central African Republic".^[76]

Syria[edit]

Over the last nine years, Syria has been in constant conflict. The war in Syria has directly killed 500,000 people, generated 5 million refugees, and internally displaced 7 million people. To help stop these atrocities the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the UN, European Union, the League of Arab States, and other countries had agreed to meet to discuss the situation at stake. The conclusion was made that the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which increased the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as a nationwide cessation of hostilities, was required in order to help those in need. The Commission on Inquiry, mandated by the Human Rights Council, has found the Syrian government while working with allied militias, has committed large-scale massacres, perpetrated war crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law as a matter of state policy. The Commission of Inquiry's third report had stated that the government had committed crimes against humanity through extermination, murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, and other inhuman acts. Due to this statement, the UN Human Rights Council has adopted at least 16 different resolutions with regard to the atrocities taking place in Syria. Despite all efforts and resolutions adopted to help uphold R2P, humanitarian aid has had limited success in reaching the affected populations.^[77]

Burundi[edit]

The country of Burundi is at grave risk for a possible civil war, if violence is not stopped. The civilians of Burundi face the serious and eminent risk of mass atrocities due to the ongoing political violence that threatens the stability of Burundi. The citizens of Burundi are being harmed through mass atrocity crimes due to targeted killings, widespread violations and abuses of human rights. Violence had increased after President Pierre Nkurnziza had announced he was seeking a third term in the country’s elections, and instructing his citizens to disarm or face action by Burundian Security forces and be labeled enemies of the nation. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reports cases of sexual violence by security forces, hate speech, and incitement to violence by some government officials. Responses by the international community include a Security Council-mandated police force with the goal of monitoring the situation. This police force has been rejected by Burundi.^[78]

Yemen Crisis[edit]

With the current armed conflict in Yemen, many civilians are facing mass atrocity crimes. These crimes are a result of the violence between pro-government forces and regional military as they fight against the Houthi rebels. The Houthi rebels and pro-Saleh personnel currently control a majority of Yemen, including the country's capital, Sana’a. In addition to the violence between these groups the nation has also been barraged by Saudi-led airstrikes for years. Between March 26, 2015 and November 8, 2018, the conflict has resulted in over 6,872^[79] civilian deaths, the majority of these from Saudi-led airstrikes. The violence has also led to 2.4 million Yemeni civilians being forcibly displaced leaving 82 percent of the population, equivalent to 21.2 million people, in need of humanitarian assistance. The ongoing violence in Yemen has allowed third-party armed groups, such as Al-Qaeda,^[80] to take advantage of the instability in the nation. For these reasons, it is clear that what remains of the Yemeni government is unable to uphold its responsibility to protect and is in need of support from other member states.^[81]

Praise for R2P[edit]

Anne-Marie Slaughter from Princeton University has called R2P "the most important shift in our conception of sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648."^[82]

Louise Arbour from the International Crisis Group said that "The responsibility to protect is the most important and imaginative doctrine to emerge on the international scene for decades."^[83]

Francis Deng, former UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, stated that "R2P is one of the most powerful and promising innovations on the international scene."^[83]

Political scientist Alex Bellamy argues (i) that there is evidence of behavioral change in the way international society responds to mass killing and (ii) that R2P considerations have influenced behavior.^[84] On the first point, Bellamy argues that criticism of R2P as insufficient change is driven by a small subset of cases (Darfur, Libya and Syria) that are not indicative of strong trends. On the second point, Bellamy finds that R2P language is used in UNSC deliberations and in the rhetoric of world leaders.

International relations professor Amitai Etzioni notes R2P challenges the Westphalian norm that state sovereignty is “absolute.” R2P establishes “conditional” state sovereignty contingent upon fulfilling certain domestic and international obligations. Etzioni considers the R2P norm of conditional sovereignty a communitarian approach as it recognizes states have the right to self-determination and self-governance, but they also have a responsibility to the international community to protect the environment, promote peace, and not harm their state’s inhabitants.^[85]

Criticism of R2P[edit]

R2P and certain implementations of it have come under criticism by some states and individuals.

National sovereignty[edit]

One of the main concerns surrounding R2P is that it infringes upon national sovereignty.^{[citation needed]} This concern is rebutted by the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in the report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. According to the first pillar of R2P, the state has the responsibility to protect its populations from mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, and according to the second pillar the international community has the responsibility to help states fulfill their responsibility. Advocates of R2P claim that the only occasions where the international community will intervene in a state without its consent is when the state is either allowing mass atrocities to occur, or is committing them, in which case the state is no longer upholding its responsibilities as a sovereign. In this sense, R2P can be understood as reinforcing sovereignty.^[86] In 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, endorsed the emerging norm of R2P, stating that there is a collective international responsibility "...exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, and serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent."^[69]

Libya, 2011[edit]

On March 19, 2011, the Security Council approved Resolution 1973, which reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population. The UNSC resolution reaffirmed "that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians."^[87] It demanded "an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute 'crimes against humanity'.... It imposed a ban on all flights in the country's airspace, a no-fly zone, and tightened sanctions on the Gadaffi government and its supporters."^[87] The resolution passed, with 10 in favor, 0 against, and 5 abstentions. Two of the five abstentions were China and Russia, both of which are permanent members of the Security Council.^[87][88]

India's UN Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri stated that "the Libyan case has already given R2P a bad name" and that "the only aspect of the resolution of interest to them (international community) was use of all necessary means to bomb the hell out of Libya". Puri also alleged that civilians had been supplied with arms and that the no-fly zone had been implemented only selectively.^[89]

Critics, such as Russia and China, said that the intervening forces led by NATO in Libya had over-stepped their mandate by taking actions that ultimately led to the overthrow of Gaddafi.^[90] While the Security Council authorised an R2P-based intervention to protect against government reprisals in rebel-held Benghazi, the UN resolution was used to provide air support for the rebellion against Gaddafi, without which he would not have been overthrown. Critics said the actions of the West in Libya created global skepticism about proposals put to the UN by the West to intervene in Syria the same year, putting the future of R2P in question.^[91]

Syria, 2011: Russian and Chinese repudiation of abuse of R2P[edit]

Several attempts were made by the U.S. government in the course of 2011 to 2013 to pass Security Council resolutions invoking R2P to justify military intervention in the Syrian Civil War. These were vetoed by Russia and China. The Russian and Chinese governments both issued statements to the effect that, in their opinion, R2P had been abused by the U.S. as a pretext for "regime change", more particularly in the case of Libya, and that as far as they were concerned they would be extremely suspicious of any future Security Council resolutions invoking R2P, based on past experience. According to the UN's own 4 October 2011 coverage of the meeting of the Security Council:

[Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin] was alarmed that compliance with Security Council resolutions in Libya had been considered a model for future actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was important to see how that model had been implemented. The demand for a ceasefire had turned into a civil war, the humanitarian, social and military consequences of which had spilled beyond Libya. The arms embargo had turned into a naval blockade on west Libya. Such models should be excluded from global practice.

[…] [China's UN Ambassador Li Baodong] hoped that the [Syrian] Government would follow through on reform and a process of dialogue. The Council should encourage those objectives while respecting Syria's sovereignty's [sic] and territorial integrity. Any action it took should contribute to peace and stability and comply with the United Nations Charter principles of non-interference in internal affairs.^[92]

Military intervention[edit]

The question of military intervention under the third pillar of R2P remains controversial.^[8][93] Several states have argued that R2P should not allow the international community to intervene militarily on states, because to do so is an infringement upon sovereignty. Others argue that this is a necessary facet of R2P, and is necessary as a last resort to stop mass atrocities. A related argument surrounds the question as to whether more specific criteria should be developed to determine when the Security Council should authorize military intervention.^[94]

Structural Problems[edit]

Political scientist Roland Paris, a proponent of R2P, argues that several problems regarding usefulness and legitimacy inherent to R2P make it vulnerable to criticism: "the more R2P is employed as a basis for military action, the more likely it is to be discredited, but paradoxically, the same will hold true if R2P’s coercive tools go unused."^[95] Paris lists the following problems as inherent to R2P, making it difficult for proponents of R2P to defend R2P and emboldening critics:^[95]

• The mixed-motives problem – The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic aim. However, states will often be wary to engage in humanitarian intervention unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. The appearance that the intervention is not strictly altruistic consequently leads some to question its legitimacy.
• The counterfactual problem – When R2P is successful, there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a mass atrocity that did not occur but would have occurred without intervention. Defenders of R2P consequently have to rely on counterfactual arguments.
• The conspicuous harm problem – While the benefits of the intervention will not be clearly visible, the destructiveness and costs of the intervention will be visible. This makes it more difficult for proponents of the intervention to defend the intervention. The destruction caused by the intervention also makes some question the legitimacy of the intervention due to the stated purpose of preventing harm.
• The end-state problem – Humanitarian intervention is prone to expand the mission beyond simply averting mass atrocities. When successful at averting mass atrocities, the intervenors will often be forced to take upon themselves more expansive mandates to ensure that threatened populations will be safe after the intervenors leave.
• The inconsistency problem – Due to the aforementioned problems, in addition to the belief that a particular military action is likely to cause more harm than good, states may fail to act in situations where mass atrocities loom. The failure to intervene in any and all situations where there is a risk of mass atrocities lead to charges of inconsistency.

See also[edit]

• Never again

Further reading[edit]

• Orford, Anne. International Authority and Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge University Press. 2011.
• Global Responsibility to Protect
• Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
• Judson, A. M. Where is R2P grounded in international law, Otago University, 2012.
• Baylis and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 394
• Deng, Francis, Rothchild, Donald, et al. "Sovereignty as Responsibility Conflict Management in Africa". (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, September 1996). c. 290pp.
• Downes, Paul. Melville's Benito Cereno and Humanitarian Intervention South Atlantic Quarterly. 103.2–3. Spring/Summer 2004, pp. 465–488.
• Evans, Gareth. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, September 2008)
• Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun. "The Responsibility to Protect" Foreign Affairs. November/December 2002.
• Hehir, Aidan. "The Responsibility to Protect: Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?" International Relations. 24/2 2010.
• Gallagher, Adrian. 'A Clash of Responsibilities: Engaging with Realist Critiques of the R2P', Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 4, no. 3, 2012, 334–357.

Hilpold, Peter (ed.), Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Brill/Martinus Nijhoff. 2015.

• Köchler, Hans, Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics. Is the Revival of the Doctrine of "Just War" Compatible with the International Rule of Law? (Studies in International Relations, XXVI.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001.
• Axworthy, Lloyd; Rock, Allan (2009). "R2P: A New and Unfinished Agenda". Global Responsibility to Protect. 1 (1): 54–69. doi:10.1163/187598409x405479.
• Bazirake, Joseph Besigye; Bukuluki, Paul (2015). "A critical reflection on the conceptual and practical limitations of the Responsibility to Protect". The International Journal of Human Rights. 19 (8): 1017–1028. doi:10.1080/13642987.2015.1082844. S2CID 146966739.
• Bellamy, Alex J (2006). "Whither the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit". Ethics and International Affairs. 20 (2): 143–177. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00012.x. S2CID 144220010.
• Bellamy, A. J. (2008). "Conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect". Global Governance. 14 (2): 135–156. doi:10.1163/19426720-01402003.
• Bellamy, Alex J (2008). "The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention". International Affairs. 84 (4): 615–639. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00729.x.
• Bellamy, A. J. (2009). "Realizing the Responsibility to Protect". International Studies Perspectives. 10 (2): 111–128. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00365.x.
• Bellamy, Alex J. 2009. Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, Cambridge: Polity.
• Bellamy, A. J. (2010). "The responsibility to protect and Australian foreign policy". Australian Journal of International Affairs. 64 (4): 432–448. doi:10.1080/10357710903544106. S2CID 154284441.
• Bellamy, Alex J (2010). "The Responsibility to Protect: Five Years On". Ethics and International Affairs. 24 (2): 143–169. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2010.00254.x. S2CID 154510390.
• Bellamy, Alex J. 2011. Global politics and the responsibility to protect: from words to deeds. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Bellamy, Alex J.; Davies, Sara E. (2009). "The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific Region". Security Dialogue. 40 (6): 547–574. doi:10.1177/0967010609349907. S2CID 145564931.
• Breau, Susan C (2006). "The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping". Journal of Conflict & Security Law. 11 (3): 429–64. doi:10.1093/jcsl/krl022.
• Briggs, E. Donald, Walter C. Soderlund and Abdel Salam Sidahmed. 2010. The responsibility to protect in Darfur: the Role of Mass Media. Lanham: Lexington Books.
• Chandler, David. 2005. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the Liberal Peace’. In Peace Operations and Global Order, eds Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams. London: Routledge.
• Chataway, Teresa (2007). "Towards normative consensus on responsibility to protect". Griffith Law Review. 16 (1): 193–224. doi:10.1080/10383441.2007.10854588. hdl:10072/18213. S2CID 143130714.
• Dallaire, Romeo (2005). "The Responsibility to Protect". New England Journal of Public Policy. 19: 2.
• Contessi, Nicola P. "Multilateralism, intervention and norm contestation: China’s stance on Darfur in the UN security council." Security Dialogue 41, 3 (2010): 323–344. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610370228
• Davies, Sara, Alex J. Bellamy and Luke Glanville. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. Leiden Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
• Doyle, Michael W (2011). "International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect". International Studies Review. 13 (1): 72–84. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00999.x.
• Evans, Gareth (2004). "When is it Right to Fight?". Survival. 46 (3): 59–82. doi:10.1093/survival/46.3.59.
• Evans, Gareth. 2004. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, reprinted in American Society of International Law 98: 78-89.
• Evans, G., The Responsibility to Protect: End Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008
• Evans, Gareth (2009). "Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect". Amsterdam Law Forum. 1 (2): 25–28. doi:10.37974/ALF.55.
• Hunt, Charles T.; Bellamy, Alex J. (2011). "Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in Peace Operations". Civil Wars. 13 (1): 1–20. doi:10.1080/13698249.2011.555688. S2CID 144818195.
• Ban, Ki-moon, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, A/65/877–S/2011/39, 28 June 2011.
• Luck, Edward C., ‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, August 2008
• Luck, Edward C (2011). "The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?". Ethics & International Affairs. 24 (4): 34.
• Pattison, James. 2010. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility To Protect. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Paley, Gregory R., 2005. The responsibility to protect: East, West and Southern African perspectives on preventing and responding to humanitarian crises. Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares.
• Pingeot, Lou and Wolfgang Obenland, 2014. In whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect. Bonn, Germany/New York: Global Policy Forum/Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung—New York Office.
• Ramesh Thakur and William Malley. Theorising the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge University Press, 2015. ISBN 978-1-107-62194-7.
• Teitt, Sarah (2011). "'The Responsibility to Protect and China's Peacekeeping Policy'". International Peacekeeping. 18 (3): 298–312. doi:10.1080/13533312.2011.563085. S2CID 144928285.
• Thakur, Ramesh (2003). "In defence of the responsibility to protect". The International Journal of Human Rights. 7 (3): 160–178. doi:10.1080/13642980310001726196. S2CID 144384228.
• Thakur, Ramesh (2005). "A Shared Responsibility for a More Secure World". Global Governance. 11 (3): 281–289. doi:10.1163/19426720-01103002.
• Thakur, Ramesh Chandra. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws, and the Use of Force in International Politics. New York: Routledge.
• Thakur, Ramesh. 2016. Review article: The Responsibility to Protect at 15. International Affairs.
• Voinov Kohler, Juliette and Richard H. Cooper. 2008. The Responsibility to Protect: the Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Weiss, Thomas and Don Hubert. 2001. The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. Ottawa: ICISS.
• Weiss, Thomas G (2004). "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era". Security Dialogue. 35 (2): 135–153. doi:10.1177/0967010604044973. S2CID 144516551.

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85. ^ Etzioni, Amitai (2016). "Defining Down Sovereignty: The Rights and Responsibilities of Nations". SSRN 2741719.
86. ^ Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, p. 7-8
87. ^ Jump up to:^a b c "Security Council Approves 'No-fly Zone' over Libya, authorizing 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions. (Includes the full text of resolution 1973)". Security Council SC/10200. United Nations, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, NY. March 17, 2011. Retrieved 2012-01-07.
88. ^ "Libya: Nigeria votes in favour of no-fly resolution". Vanguard (Nigeria). 18 March 2011.
89. ^ "Selective Use of R2P to Secure Regime Change: India".
90. ^ Paris, Roland (2020). "The Right to Dominate: How Old Ideas About Sovereignty Pose New Challenges for World Order". International Organization. 74 (3): 453–489. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000077. ISSN 0020-8183.
91. ^ "R2P, R.I.P." New York Times. 8 November 2011. The Security Council authorised an R2P-based intervention to protect Benghazi but did not authorise the provision of air support for the rebellion against Qaddafi. And it is almost certain that without that support he would not have been overthrown. ... Regime change became the West’s policy, and the civilian-protection mandate of R2P was its cover.
92. ^ "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria's Crackdown". un.org.
93. ^ Seybolt, Taylor B. (2007). Humanitarian military intervention: the conditions for success and failure. New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-19-925243-5.
94. ^ "Responsibility to Protect: The 'Real' Debate on R2P – STWR – Share The World's Resources". stwr.org.
95. ^ Jump up to:^a b Paris, Roland (2014-12-09). "Is it possible to meet the 'Responsibility to Protect'?". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2016-04-23.

Sources[edit]

External links[edit]

• IPI's Edward C. Luck briefs UN General Assembly on R2P, 9 August 2010
• Whose Responsibility to Protect?, debate between four R2P practitioners, October 2009.
• Newt Gingrich and George J. Mitchell, Report Card from America: UN Reform, International Herald Tribune, 28 November 2005 (American Enterprise Institute)
• Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
• International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
• Asia-Pacific Centre for R2P

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schutzverantwortung

Die Schutzverantwortung (auch Verantwortung zum Schutz; englisch Responsibility to Protect, auch R2P oder RtoP abgekürzt) ist ein Konzept der internationalen Politik und des Völkerrechts zum Schutze des Menschen vor schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Brüchen des humanitären Völkerrechts. 

Gegenstand und Anwendung[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Die Schutzverantwortung trifft zunächst den Einzelstaat und umfasst seine Pflicht, das Wohlergehen der ihm kraft seiner Personal- oder Gebietshoheit unterstellten Bürger zu gewährleisten. Bei der Wahrnehmung dieser Verantwortung wird er von der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft unterstützt, der eine subsidiäre Schutzverantwortung zukommt. Ist jedoch die politische Führung eines Staates nicht fähig oder willens, seine Bürger vor schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu schützen, darf die internationale Staatengemeinschaft zum Schutz der bedrohten Bevölkerung eingreifen. Dazu stehen ihr nach Maßgabe der Charta der Vereinten Nationen zivile und militärische Mittel zur Verfügung, über deren Einsatz der Sicherheitsrat entscheidet.

Theoretische Grundlage[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Theoretische Grundlage ist die Definition von Souveränität als Verantwortung (sovereignty as responsibility), wonach ein Staat Verantwortung für den Schutz seiner Bevölkerung übernehmen muss, um als souverän zu gelten. Die R2P hilft damit, universale Moralvorstellungen zum Schutz des Menschen international zu verwirklichen. Als schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen, zu deren Unterbindung die subsidiäre Schutzverantwortung der R2P zum Tragen kommen kann, werden Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und ethnische Säuberungen identifiziert.

Entwicklung[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Sie wurde maßgeblich von der International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in den Jahren 2000/2001 entwickelt und international verbreitet, wenngleich sich ihre wesentlichen Züge bereits seit längerem in der politischen und rechtlichen Diskussion befanden. Auf dem Weltgipfel 2005 (2005 World Summit) der Vereinten Nationen in New York wurde sie – beschränkt auf den Schutz der Bevölkerung vor Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen, ethnischer Säuberung und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit^[1][2] – von fast allen Staaten der Erde in einer (völkerrechtlich allerdings nicht verbindlichen) Erklärung (General Assembly Resolution 60/1, kurz A/RES/60/1) vom 24. Oktober 2005 ausdrücklich anerkannt^[3] und im folgenden Jahr in Resolution 1674 des UN-Sicherheitsrats erstmals in einem völkerrechtlich verbindlichen Dokument erwähnt.^[4] UNO-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon veröffentlichte 2009 einen Bericht zur Umsetzung der Schutzverantwortung, die auf drei Säulen basiert und insbesondere die Bedeutung einer rechtzeitigen Erkennung und Einleitung von präventiven Maßnahmen bei derartigen Verbrechen hervorhebt.^[5][6]

Gliederung nach dem Entwurf der ICISS[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Nach dem Entwurf der ICISS gliedert sich die R2P in drei Teilverantwortlichkeiten: die Responsibility to Prevent, die Responsibility to React und die Responsibility to Rebuild:

1. Die Pflicht zur Prävention zielt auf die Vermeidung von Situationen, in denen es zu schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen kommt, insbesondere durch den Aufbau einer guten Verwaltung (good governance) und die Bekämpfung tiefverwurzelter Ursachen für Konflikte (root causes). Auch eine Anklage vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof ist insoweit denkbar.
2. Die Pflicht zur Reaktion verpflichtet zu einer Beseitigung bzw. Unterbindung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Mittel hierzu sind nicht-militärische Zwangsmaßnahmen der Staatengemeinschaft wie Waffenembargos und das Einfrieren von Bankkonten. Als ultima ratio kommen auch militärische Interventionen in Betracht, wenngleich diese nur in zwei eng umrissenen Situationen gerechtfertigt sein sollen: im Falle eines Massensterbens (large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation) und im Falle einer ethnischen Säuberung (large scale „ethnic cleansing“, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape)^[7]. Die Befugnis, eine solche militärische Intervention zu autorisieren, geht gemäß der R2P jedoch nicht auf einzelne Staaten über, sondern verbleibt beim Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen.
3. Die Pflicht zum Wiederaufbau verpflichtet schließlich zu einer Konfliktnachsorge. Wichtigste Mittel sind hierbei das Entwaffnen und Versöhnen ehemals verfeindeter Gruppen sowie der Wiederaufbau zerstörter Infrastruktur. Unterstützend kommt hierbei die Kommission für Friedenskonsolidierung zum Einsatz.

Des Weiteren müssen folgende Bedingungen gegeben sein, die den Bedingungen für den gerechtfertigten Einsatz militärischer Mittel (für den bellum iustum, den gerechten Krieg^[1]) generell entsprechen: ^[8]

1. legitimate authority: Es bedarf einer legitimen Autorität, die die humanitäre Intervention erlaubt (zumeist der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen).
2. right intention: Die intervenierenden Staaten müssen vorrangig das Motiv haben, Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu verhindern und zu stoppen.
3. last resort: Eine militärische humanitäre Intervention muss den letzten Ausweg darstellen.
4. proportional means: Die Verhältnismäßigkeit der eingesetzten Mittel muss bedacht werden.
5. reasonable prospects: Es muss eine realistische Aussicht auf Erfolg der Mission bestehen.

Von der humanitären Intervention unterscheidet sich die Schutzverantwortung in dreifacher Weise:

1. Der dem Konzept der humanitären Intervention immanente Rechtfertigungszwang bedingt eine starke Zurückhaltung der Staaten, in innerstaatliche Konflikte aktiv einzugreifen. Diese Zurückhaltung zeigte sich insbesondere während des Völkermords in Ruanda – mit verheerenden Folgen. Die Schutzverantwortung verlagert den völkerrechtlichen Rechtfertigungsdruck für ein Handeln der Staaten bei Menschenrechtsverletzungen, indem sie entsprechende Pflichten formuliert.
2. Die Souveränität eines Staates und das daraus hervorgehende absolute Interventionsverbot, wie es Art. 2 Ziff. 7 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen gewährleistet, werden durch die Schutzverantwortung neu definiert. Als Folge eines Verstoßes gegen seine Schutzverantwortung verwirkt ein Einzelstaat sein Recht auf Nichteinmischung in seine internen Angelegenheiten.
3. Die humanitäre Intervention betrifft allein die Rechtfertigung militärischer Maßnahmen und damit nur einen Teilaspekt der Schutzverantwortung. Mit ihren Präventions-, Reaktions- und Wiederaufbauelementen verfolgt letztere einen weit umfassenderen Ansatz.

Weltgipfel 2005, Abschlusserklärung[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

UN-Hauptquartier, Tagungsort des Weltgipfels 2005.

Die Abschlusserklärung A/RES/60/1 vom 24. Oktober 2005 enthält folgende Ausführungen zur Schutzverantwortung:^[9]

138. Jeder einzelne Staat hat die Verantwortung für den Schutz seiner Bevölkerung vor Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen, ethnischer Säuberung und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit. Zu dieser Verantwortung gehört es, solche Verbrechen, einschließlich der Anstiftung dazu, mittels angemessener und notwendiger Maßnahmen zu verhüten. Wir akzeptieren diese Verantwortung und werden im Einklang damit handeln. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte gegebenenfalls die Staaten ermutigen und ihnen dabei behilflich sein, diese Verantwortung wahrzunehmen, und die Vereinten Nationen bei der Schaffung einer Frühwarnkapazität unterstützen.

139. Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat durch die Vereinten Nationen auch die Pflicht, geeignete diplomatische, humanitäre und andere friedliche Mittel nach den Kapiteln VI und VIII der Charta einzusetzen, um beim Schutz der Bevölkerung vor Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen, ethnischer Säuberung und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit behilflich zu sein. In diesem Zusammenhang sind wir bereit, im Einzelfall und in Zusammenarbeit mit den zuständigen Regionalorganisationen rechtzeitig und entschieden kollektive Maßnahmen über den Sicherheitsrat im Einklang mit der Charta, namentlich Kapitel VII, zu ergreifen, falls friedliche Mittel sich als unzureichend erweisen und die nationalen Behörden offenkundig dabei versagen, ihre Bevölkerung vor Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen, ethnischer Säuberung und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit zu schützen. Wir betonen die Notwendigkeit, dass die Generalversammlung die Verantwortung für den Schutz von Bevölkerungsgruppen vor Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen, ethnischer Säuberung und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und die sich daraus ergebenden Auswirkungen eingedenk der Grundsätze der Charta und des Völkerrechts weiter prüft. Wir beabsichtigen außerdem, uns erforderlichenfalls und soweit angezeigt dazu zu verpflichten, den Staaten beim Aufbau von Kapazitäten zum Schutz ihrer Bevölkerung vor Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen, ethnischer Säuberung und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit behilflich zu sein und besonders belasteten Staaten beizustehen, bevor Krisen und Konflikte ausbrechen.

140. Wir unterstützen uneingeschränkt die Mission des Sonderberaters des Generalsekretärs für die Verhütung von Völkermord.

Die in ihr festgelegte R2P ist beschränkter als der Entwurf der ICISS, als dass sie auf den Schutz der Bevölkerung vor einer Liste spezieller Verbrechen (Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen, ethnische Säuberung und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit) eingeschränkt ist. Es ist auch nicht die Rede von einer Interventionspflicht, sondern von einer Bereitschaft. Die Erklärung erwähnt auch nicht die im ICISS-Entwurf aufgeführten Bedingungen für den gerechtfertigten Einsatz militärischer Mittel oder den Wiederaufbau.^[1]

Die in der Abschlusserklärung A/RES/60/1 festgelegte R2P hat keine völkerrechtliche Bindungswirkung.^[10] Jedoch wird durch sie deutlich, dass ein Regime sich gegenüber der internationalen Gemeinschaft nicht auf das völkerrechtliche Gebot der Nichteinmischung in innere Angelegenheiten berufen kann, wenn es bestimmte Verbrechen an der eigenen Bevölkerung ausführt.

Entwicklungen nach 2005[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Erneut von Bedeutung war die Schutzverantwortung während des Bürgerkrieges in Libyen. In den zwei Resolutionen 1970 und 1973 ermahnte der Sicherheitsrat die libysche Regierung, ihre Verantwortung gegenüber der eigenen Bevölkerung wahrzunehmen. Aus diesen zwei Resolutionen geht nicht hervor, ob die Schutzverantwortung von der libyschen Regierung auf die internationale Gemeinschaft übergeht und ob dies eine Grundlage für Maßnahmen mit militärischen Mitteln auf Grundlage eines Sicherheitsratsmandats nach Kapitel VII der UN-Charta darstellt.^[11]

Der internationale Militäreinsatz in Libyen 2011 gilt als Präzedenzfall der Anwendung der R2P.

Nach der Resolution 1973 bezog sich der Sicherheitsrat in mehreren Resolutionen ausdrücklich auf A/RES/60/1 oder die Resolution 1674. Weitere Resolutionen griffen ohne Nennung dieser Dokumente die Schutzverantwortung von Staaten bzw. der internationalen Gemeinschaft auf.^[12]

Die Anwendung von R2P in Libyen ebenso wie ihre Nichtanwendung in anderen Situationen, insbesondere im Bürgerkrieg in Syrien, war immer wieder Gegenstand von Auseinandersetzungen und Kritik. Beispielsweise schreibt die Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen: „Im Zuge der massiven Kritik im Nachgang der NATO-Intervention wurde westlichen Staaten vorgeworfen, sie hätten das eigentliche Ziel – die Zivilbevölkerung vor gravierenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu schützen – für ihre eigenen Zwecke missbraucht. Die Zurückhaltung des UN-Sicherheitsrats gegenüber der Gewalt in Syrien verschärfte die Debatten und warf die Frage auf, warum hier kein vergleichbares entschlossenes Handeln unter Berufung auf die Schutzverantwortung stattfand.“^[13]

Seit der Anwendung der Norm beim NATO-Militäreinsatz in Libyen betrachtet auch die Politikwissenschaft die etwaige Ausnutzung von UN-Mandaten zu eigenen Zwecken durch die autorisierten Akteure stärker und systematischer. So ist ein allgemeiner Trend zu mehr Kontrolle der Einsätze durch die UN festzustellen.^[14] Die Grundproblematik solcher Einsätze ist die Notwendigkeit, sie an Dritte zu delegieren, die diese Autorisation ausnutzen können.^[15][16][17] Dabei sind zwei verschiedene Szenarien zu unterscheiden: Der erste Fall behandelt solche, bei denen einer oder mehrere der Mitgliedsstaaten des Sicherheitsrates selbst den Militäreinsatz ausführen (wie etwa in Libyen). Dort können die entsprechenden Sicherheitsratsmitglieder ihre institutionelle Macht nutzen, um die Kontrollmechanismen gering zu halten.^[18][19] Der zweite Fall betrifft all die Missionen, bei denen die implementierenden Akteure nicht Teil des Sicherheitsrates sind. Dort führen stärkere Kontrollmechanismen zu einer geringen Mandatsausnutzung durch die autorisierten Staaten oder Allianzen bei der Implementation der UN-Resolution.^[17]

Kritik[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

Es wird kritisiert, dass die R2P ihrem eigenen Auftrag nicht gerecht werde: Sie sei nicht neutral, da sie der Parteipolitik der Großmächte verhaftet bleibe; ihre universelle Gültigkeit sei nicht glaubhaft, zumal kein Konsens über die Bedingungen für die Geltendmachung von R2P bestehe; als Konsequenz mangelnder Neutralität und Universalität stehe ihre Legitimität infrage.^[20]

Kritiker des Prinzips wenden zudem ein, dass mit der Schutzverantwortung das Prinzip der Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines Staates ausgehebelt werde, das in der UN-Charta als Rechtsprinzip verankert ist.^[21] Ein Konzept der Schutzverantwortung, das nicht ohne Ansehen der Umstände angewendet wird, verliere an Bedeutung und Akzeptanz, und die Entscheidung zwischen Schutz oder Nichteinmischung werde zu einer Frage der politischen Opportunität.^[22] Weiterhin wird eingewendet, dass nicht jede Kriegshandlung innerhalb eines Staates als Völkermord zu werten sei und dass die Schwierigkeiten eines demokratischen State-Building ohne historisches Fundament und nach einem von außen erzwungenen Regimewechsel oft unterschätzt würden.^[23] Befürworter der Norm argumentieren hingegen, dass die Schutzverantwortung einen historischen Schritt zur Verhinderung schwerster Menschenrechtsverletzungen darstelle.^[24]

Siehe auch[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

• Konvention über die Verhütung und Bestrafung des Völkermordes

Literatur[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

• International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Hrsg.): The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa 2001. ISBN 0-88936-960-7. PDF(434 kB) (Memento vom 13. Mai 2005 im Internet Archive).
• Francis Deng u. a.: Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996. ISBN 0-8157-1827-6.
• Gareth Evans: The Responsibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. ISBN 0-8157-2504-3.
• Alex J. Bellamy: Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-7456-4348-9.
• Irene Etzersdorfer, Ralph Janik: Staat, Krieg und Schutzverantwortung, facultas/utb, Wien 2016, ISBN 3-8252-4408-3
• Christopher Verlage: Responsibility to Protect: Ein neuer Ansatz im Völkerrecht zur Verhinderung von Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009. ISBN 978-3-16-149812-1.
• Anne Rausch: Responsibility to Protect. Eine juristische Betrachtung. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 2011. ISBN 978-3-631-60576-9.
• Philip Cunliffe: Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice. Oxon: Routledge, 2011. ISBN 978-0-415-58623-8.
• Cristina Gabriela Badescu: Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. Security and human rights. London: Routledge, 2011. ISBN 978-0-415-58627-6.
• Hugh Breakey (2012): Review and Analysis: The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ Working Paper developed from Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts- Academic-Practitioner International Workshop, Sydney, Australia. Nov. 17-18, 2010. PDF (1830 kB)
• Lou Pingeot und Wolfgang Obenland: In whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect. Bonn/New York: Global Policy Forum 2014. ISBN 978-3-943126-15-0. PDF (885 kB)

Weblinks[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

• Schutzverantwortung.de – Internetportal der deutschen Menschenrechtsorganisation Genocide Alert e.V.
• The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect – Globales Zentrum für Schutzverantwortung, gemeinsame Einrichtung internationaler humanitärer Organisationen (englisch)
• Heike Krieger: Das Konzept der Internationalen Schutzverantwortung, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 25. Juli 2015
• Zehn Jahre Schutzverantwortung – Anspruch und Wirklichkeit der Umsetzung des Konzepts durch Deutschland (BT-Drs. 18/5626), 22. Juli 2015

Einzelnachweise[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]

1. ↑ ^{Hochspringen nach:a b c} Peter Rudolf, Schutzverantwortung und humanitäre Intervention, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2. September 2013
2. ↑ Andreas von Arnauld: Völkerrecht, C.F. Müller Verlag, 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4322-8, S. 134.
3. ↑ UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 vom 24. Oktober 2005, Abs. 138–140, dtsche. Übersetzung: RESOLUTION 60/1
4. ↑ UN Doc. S/RES/1674 (2006) (PDF; 1,7 MB) vom 28. April 2006, Abs. 4.
5. ↑ Die Responsibility to Protect umsetzen: Zusammenfassung des UN-Berichts zur Schutzverantwortung der internationalen Gemeinschaft.genocide-alert.de, 5. April 2009, archiviert vom Original am 16. November 2012; abgerufen am 22. Mai 2013.
6. ↑ UN Doc. A/63/677 vom 12. Januar 2009 (deutsche Fassung)
7. ↑ ICISS-Report (Memento vom 13. Mai 2005 im Internet Archive), 2001, Rn. 4.19.
8. ↑ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility To Protect. (PDF) Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. International Development Research Centre, 2011, archiviert vom Original am 9. Januar 2016;abgerufen am 29. Januar 2016 (englisch).
9. ↑ UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 vom 24. Oktober 2005, Abs. 138–140. Zitiert nach der deutschen Fassung des UN Doc. A/63/677 vom 12. Januar 2009.
10. ↑ Christian Schaller: Die völkerrechtliche Dimension der »Responsibility to Protect«. In: SWP-Aktuell 2008/A 46. Juni 2008, abgerufen am 2. September 2017: „Die ‚Responsibility to Protect‘, wie sie im Abschlussdokument des Weltgipfels ihren Niederschlag gefunden hat, begründet aus sich heraus keine völkerrechtlichen Rechte oder Pflichten, weder für einzelne Staaten noch für die internationale Gemeinschaft.“(PDF).
11. ↑ Robin Geiß, Maral Kashgar, UN-Maßnahmen gegen Libyen: Eine völkerrechtliche Betrachtung (Memento des Originals vom 21. Juni 2013 im Internet Archive)  Info: Der Archivlink wurde automatisch eingesetzt und noch nicht geprüft. Bitte prüfe Original- und Archivlink gemäß Anleitung und entferne dann diesen Hinweis.. In: Vereinte Nationen, Jahrgang 59, 2011, Heft 3, S. 99–104. S. 100.
12. ↑ Daniela Haarhuis: 10 Jahre Responsibility to Protect: Ein Sieg für die Menschenrechte? – Eine politik- und rechtswissenschaftliche Analyse.(PDF) In: MRM – MenschenRechtsMagazin Heft 1/2015. Abgerufen am 2. September 2017. S. 19–28. Siehe Kapitel II, Abschnitt „2. Rechtliche Bindungswirkung“, S. 22–23.
13. ↑ Tina Schmidt: Schutzverantwortung - Wie weiter nach Libyen?Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V., 7. Mai 2012,abgerufen am 2. September 2017.
14. ↑ N. Blokker: Is the authorization authorized? Powers and practice of the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force by 'coalitions of the able and willing'. In: European Journal of International Law. Band 11, Nr. 3, 1. Januar 2000, ISSN 0938-5428, S. 541–568, doi:10.1093/ejil/11.3.541 (oup.com [abgerufen am 14. Dezember 2017]).
15. ↑ Erik Voeten: Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. In: American Political Science Review. Band 95, Nr. 4, Dezember 2001, S. 845–858, doi:10.1017/s000305540101005x (cambridge.org).
16. ↑ Jules Lobel, Michael Ratner: Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime. In: The American Journal of International Law. Band 93, Nr. 1, 1999, S. 124–154, doi:10.2307/2997958, JSTOR:2997958.
17. ↑ ^{Hochspringen nach:a b} Oliver Weber: The Risk of Authorization. Explaining Mandate Exploitation in delegated UNSC Missions. Research Gate, Mannheim 2017.
18. ↑ Yf Reykers: Constructive ambiguity or stringent monitoring? Towards understanding UN Security Council oversight over non-UN-led forces. In: Global Affairs. Band 3, Nr. 1, 1. Januar 2017, ISSN 2334-0460, S. 17–29, doi:10.1080/23340460.2017.1297684.
19. ↑ Yf Reykers: Delegation without control? Institutional choice and autonomy in UNSC-authorised military interventions. Leuven International and European Studies (LINES), Leuven 2017.
20. ↑ Siddharth Mallavarapu, "Schutzverantwortung als neues Machtinstrument", in: APuZ 37/2013, S. 3 f. Zitiert (als „Quellentext: Schutzverantwortung: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit“) nach: Heike Krieger: Das Konzept der Internationalen Schutzverantwortung. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 7. Juli 2015, abgerufen am 2. September 2017.
21. ↑ Gaddafi erklärt UNO-Beschluss für ungültig, Kleine Zeitung vom 19. März 2011
22. ↑ Otfried Nassauer: Übers Ziel hinausgeschossen. In: derStandard.at.28. April 2011, abgerufen am 2. September 2017.
23. ↑ Reinhard Merkel: Völkerrecht contra Bürgerkrieg: Die Militärintervention gegen Gaddafi ist illegitim in der FAZ vom 22. März 2011.
24. ↑ Robert Schütte: Ein großer Schritt für die Menschheit. In: The European. 4. Mai 2011. Abgerufen am 22. Mai 2013.